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The main topic for this master thesis is the choice of entry mode for successful business 
in emerging markets, with a focus on Norwegian companies in the Indonesian market. 
The problem statement of the thesis is as follows: What are the main factors affecting the 
choice of entry mode for Norwegian companies in the Indonesian market?  
 
Several studies on the choice of entry modes have previously been conducted. However, 
a study of factors that impact the decision making of Norwegian companies entering the 
Indonesian market have not previously been done. The main objective for this thesis was 
therefore to provide a deeper insight into the establishment of Norwegian business 
operations in the Indonesian market. The findings of the thesis should consequently be of 
interest to Norwegian companies aspiring to establish themselves in Indonesia, as well as 
for companies that already have a presence there.  
  
The research method for the thesis is a qualitative case study, based on a sample of six 
Norwegian companies currently engaged in the Indonesian market. The main sources of 
data collection consisted of interviews with people in managerial positions in each 
company, content analysis, and the researcher’s personal observations from time spent in 
Indonesia.  
 
One of the main findings was that local partnerships were preferred by most of the 
companies, irrespective of company size, sector and international experience. A high 
level of management control was also found to be important, and many of the companies 
therefore preferred high-control entry modes. The majority of the companies stated a high 
level of perceived cultural distance between Indonesia and Norway, and high levels of 
perceived risk regarding their operations there. Corruption, lack of trust, irregular import 
quotas, and a complex bureaucracy were some of the main sources of this perceived risk. 
Company size and level of resource commitment also seemed to play a major role in the 
choice of entry mode. Small, low resource commitment-companies often preferred more 
flexible, contractual entry modes, such as exporting and licensing, while large, high 
resource commitment-companies preferred direct entry modes such as joint ventures and 
wholly owned subsidiaries. Additionally, Indonesian rule of law was found to have an 
impact on the choice of entry mode, with special directives for foreign direct investments, 
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differences regarding sector regulations, and rules for the acquiring of licenses and 
permits.  
 
Conclusively, the key factor for successful business in Indonesia was found to reside in 
the creation of strong, personal relationships with local stakeholders and partners, basing 
decisions on knowledge and understanding rather than on assumptions. 
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1. Introduction  
The main topic for this master thesis is the choice of entry mode for successful business 
in emerging markets, focusing on Norwegian companies in the Indonesian market. 
According to Werner (2002), “entry modes” is the third most researched field in 
international management. However, the study of factors that impact the decision making 
of Norwegian companies entering the Indonesian market have not previously been 
conducted. The main objective for this thesis is therefore to provide deeper insight into 
the establishment of Norwegian business operations in Indonesia, with the aspiration that 
the findings can be of interest for Norwegian companies who wish to establish 
themselves in emerging markets such as Indonesia, for Innovation Norway’s future work 
in Indonesia, and for the Norwegian companies that are already established there.  
 
Norway now finds itself in the middle of a rising economic crisis. And with this 
increasing financial uncertainty, it becomes even more important to consider new and 
innovative ways of increasing profit, developing products, and reaching new and more 
fruitful markets. On a global scale, the business world is becoming more dynamic and 
cross-cultural than ever. But for a company to survive in this increasingly competitive 
and challenging marketplace, managers and employees need to strengthen their cross-
cultural competence, or as Gertsen and Søderberg (2010 p. 249) put it; “to raise their 
cultural intelligence”.  
 
Many Norwegian - as well as other western companies have been outsourcing their 
manufacturing operations to Asian countries such as China, Vietnam, India, and 
Bangladesh for several years. But it is not only in this part of the value chain that there 
are possibilities for foreign investments. A growing middle class and increasing 
purchasing power in many third world countries are now making some markets emerge 
with new and profitable opportunities for foreign direct investments. Indonesia - 
Southeast Asia’s largest economy, is one of these countries that are getting increasing 
attention as up and coming emerging markets.  
 
As discussed by Tian (2007), selecting an entry mode is one of the most important 
strategic decisions that a company has to make when entering a new market. Whether it is 
for reactive or proactive reasons, entering a foreign market requires careful consideration 
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and knowledge about the specific market, the business culture, and the socioeconomic 
conditions and institutions of the country. And how a company chooses to deal with these 
factors will have a great impact on the company’s success or failure. While working as an 
Intern in Innovation Norway in Jakarta, I experienced Norwegian companies operating in 
Indonesia first hand, which initially sparked my interest for this topic and led to the 
creation of the following problem statement: What are the main factors affecting the 
choice of entry mode for Norwegian companies in the Indonesian market?  
 
The research method for the thesis is a qualitative case study, based on a sample of 
Norwegian companies currently engaged in the Indonesian market. A qualitative research 
method was chosen because it, as discussed by Myers (2013, p. 5), “is designed to help 
researchers understand the social and cultural contexts (..) within which decisions and 
actions takes place,” which was also the main objective for this thesis. A case study 
became the logical choice within the qualitative method, since it according to Yin (2014, 
p. 3), “allows the researcher to retain a holistic and real-world perspective” of the topic. 
The main sources of data collection consist of interviews with people in managerial 
positions in the different case companies, content analysis, and the researcher’s personal 
observations from time spent in Indonesia. 
 
The next chapter of the thesis is a descriptive chapter, looking more closely at challenges 
and opportunities for Norwegian business in Indonesia. Then, relevant theory and 
previous empirical findings will be presented in Chapter 3, as well as six propositions 
related to the problem statement, subsequent to the appropriate sub-chapters. Afterwards, 
an overview of the research method will be presented in Chapter 4, followed by an 
introduction of the six participating companies and the collected data for each company 
in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 consists of analysis and discussion based on the six propositions, 
as well as previous empirical findings. Lastly, chapter 7 will provide a conclusion of the 
topic, as well as limitations of the study and recommendations for future research.    
 
A “Reflective Note” with discussions on how the thesis topic relates to the subjects of 




2. Challenges and Opportunities for Norwegian business in 
Indonesia 
In this chapter, an introduction to the term emerging markets will be presented. Then a 
deeper look will be taken at the Indonesian market, the country’s economy, business 
culture, corruption, and rule of law. A brief country comparison of Norway and Indonesia 
will then be made, followed by a presentation of Norwegian operations in Indonesia at 
present, and lastly, a look at the future business opportunities for Norwegian companies 
within the different sectors Maritime, Aquaculture, Energy & Environment and Oil & 
Gas.  
 
2.1 Emerging Markets 
The term emerging markets was first brought up by economists at the International 
Finance Corporation in 1981, when the group was promoting the first mutual fund 
investments in developing countries (Khanna, Palepu & Bullock, 2010). More specific 
criteria for defining merging markets are presented in the figure below.  
 
 
Figure 1: Emerging Markets. Source: Mobius (1996)      
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As described by Mobius (1996) in the figure above, the “criteria” for emerging markets 
are that the country must be a low to middle-income country, with relatively low 
standards of living and a low level of industrialisation. A low market capitalization 
relative to the country’s GDP is common, as well as growth potential through economic 
liberalisation, openness to foreign investment, and a recent economic growth.    
 
According to Khanna, Palepu and Bullock (2010), markets such as Brazil, China, India, 
and Russia have been emerging the last years due to their recent fast economic growth. 
And the opening of these large economies to global capital, technology, and talent over 
the past two decades has fundamentally changed their economic and business 
environments (Khanna et al., 2010). As a result, the GDP growth rates of these countries 
have dramatically outpaced those of more developed economies, lifting millions out of 
poverty, creating new middle classes, and new markets (Khanna et al., 2010). According 
to Khanna et al. (2010) some view the financial crisis of 2008–2009 as an accelerating 
factor for the emergence of these markets, which are now becoming dominant players in 
the global economy.  
 
According to Euromonitor International (2015) Nigeria, Indonesia, Mexico, the 
Philippines and Turkey are markets that are now emerging, and that are predicted to 
become new economic giants for the future. Indonesia is at present Southeast Asia's 
largest economy, and the country is according to Indonesia Investments (2016) being 
increasingly mentioned as an appropriate candidate to be included in the BRIC countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China) since it is rapidly showing signs of similar newly 
advanced economic development. 
 
2.2 The Indonesian Market 
Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelagic state, located in Southeast Asia between 
Australia and China (The World Bank, 2015). With a population of 254.5 Million, 
Indonesia is now the world’s fourth most populous nation, the world’s 10th largest 
economy in terms of purchasing power parity, and has recently become a member of the 
G20 (The World Bank, 2015). The country’s GDP was $888.5 billion in 2014, and the 
country’s gross national income per capita has steadily risen, from $560 in the year 2000 
to $3,650 in 2014 (The World Bank, 2015). 
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According to a report by Oxford Business Group (2016), manufacturing and industry are 
seen as the main drivers of new growth in Indonesia, and as 2015 drew to a close, 
international financial institutions maintained GDP growth forecasts of around 5% for 
2016 (Oxford Business Group, 2016). Foreign direct investment was hitting a new record 
in 2014, and Indonesia’s trade and investment flows have improved considerably over the 
last 10 years (Oxford Business Group, 2016). According Oxford Business Group (2016), 
there are now early signs that Indonesia’s economy is beginning to feel the effects of the 
government’s renewed infrastructure focus, with many new projects including power 
plants, highways, and a $1.5 billion transit project in the capital Jakarta. The government 
has also pledged to introduce tax incentives and measures aimed at attracting capital 
inflows, including lower energy tariffs for labour-intensive industries such as 
petrochemicals, ceramics and glass (Oxford Business Group, 2016). 
  
2.2.1 Corruption 
There is no hiding that corruption is a major issue in Indonesia. According to 
Transparency International (2015) the Corruption Perception Index score of Indonesia is 
36 (where 100 is clean and 0 is highly corrupt), which indicates quite a high level of 
corruption. One of the challenges with corruption in Indonesia is that briberies and 
facilitation fees are often not considered corruption. Fighting corruption in a business 
setting is therefore very hard, as Indonesian employees view these “fees” as necessary 
parts of doing their job.   
 
The current president of Indonesia, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), has made the fight against 
corruption one of his main missions. A major method for achieving this has been to try 
and remove some of the existing opportunities for corruption (the Economist, 2015). 
Already when he was the governor of Jakarta, he moved many government services 
online, denying corrupt bureaucrats the chances for extortion, and is now encouraging all 
private Indonesian enterprises to do the same (The Economist, 2015). The move towards 
online procurement has according to The Economist (2015) already saved Indonesia 
billions of dollars. Jokowi has also made a move to clean up the oil-and-gas sector. After 
being appointed president, Jokowi replaced the entire board of the state-owned oil and 
gas firm Pertamina (the Economist, 2015). And in May 2015 the government decided to 
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liquidate Petral, an offshore trading arm of Pertamina, as it had long been suspected of 
being controlled by Indonesia’s “oil-and-gas mafia” (the Economist, 2015).  
 
2.2.2 Institutions and Rule of Law 
The understanding of a country’s formal and informal institutions can be crucial in 
whether a company's expansion abroad becomes successful or not. The formal 
institutions are according to Peng (2006) political laws and regulations, judicial decisions 
and economic contracts, in other words, the power of the political authorities that a 
company may face. The informal institutions are the social norms of behaviour that exist 
in a society, which makes the basis of a country’s cultural and ethical context (Scott, 
1995). It is important to be aware of both the formal and informal institutions of the 
country, as misinterpretation can contribute to limiting the range of possible actions for 
the company. 
 
With Indonesia ranked 114 out of 189 countries in the Ease of Doing Business 2015 
report made by the World Bank (2016), the business environment in Indonesia can be 
described as somewhat challenging. Laws tend to be unclear or conflicting, and many of 
the formal dispute settlement mechanisms are considered to be ineffective (Export.Gov, 
2016). Deregulation has contributed to reducing some barriers, but non-tariff barriers still 
remain a challenge for foreign investors (Export.Gov, 2016).  
 
According to Indonesia Investments (2016), there are two legal entities that are permitted 
for foreign direct investments in Indonesia:  
1. A foreign investment limited liability-company (Perseroan Terbatas Penanaman 
Modal Asing, or PT PMA).  
2. A Representative Office.  
 
If the company’s plan is to generate revenues, profit or engage in sales directly in 
Indonesia, then you need a PT PMA, in other words - a wholly owned, Indonesian 
subsidiary (Indonesia Investments, 2016). If the aim is to explore business opportunities 
in Indonesia through market research, networking, and so on, without engaging in 
commercial transactions, then it is according to Indonesia Investments (2016) better to 
establish a representative office. The company can in that case decide to establish a PT 
PMA later on. Both the limited liability foreign investment company (PT PMA) and the 
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foreign representative office need to get a certificate from the Trade Attaché of the 
Republic of Indonesia (Indonesia Investments, 2016). 
 
There are however some sectors that are closed, or partially closed, to foreign investment 
(Indonesia Investments, 2016). The sectors that are open to foreign investment can be 
found in the Negative Investment List (Daftar Negatif Investasi), a list that is compiled - 
and regularly revised by the Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board (Badan 
Koordinasi Penanaman Modal) (Indonesia Investments, 2016). If a sector is partially 
closed to foreign investment, the list states a maximum allowed percentage of foreign 
ownership (Indonesia Investments, 2016). This indicates the need to have a local partner 
in order to be able to engage in business in that particular sector. Relevant sectors for this 
thesis that have particular restrictions are according to the Negative Investment List, the 
Oil & Gas sector and the Energy sector (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal, 2016).  
 
The table below show some specific differences between the establishments of a foreign 
investment company (PT PMA) and a representative office in Indonesia.  
 
 Foreign Investment Company Representative Office 
Allowed 
Activities 
All business activities related to the 
sector it is engaged in and received 
approval for from the Investment 
Coordinating Board of Indonesia. 
Only for market research & local 
representation. 
Best Option for Companies that want to engage in 
commercial activities in Indonesia 
Companies that want to engage 
in market research, networking, 
etc. It is strictly forbidden to 
generate profit and revenue or 




Foreign ownership varies between 
0% - 100% depending on the 
Negative Investment List 
No restriction 
Minimum IDR 10 billion (paid up capital at No requirement 
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Capital least 25% of investment plan) 
Benefits Operates as an independent limited 
liability company within the 
business classification 
No capital requirement, 
Takes less time to establish 
Disadvantages Large capital requirement Cannot engage in commercial 
activities, 






All shareholders, directors and 
commissioners eligible for work 
permit, unlimited amount of 
business visa sponsorships, work 
permits can be issued to foreign 
experts 
Work permit for the chief 
representative, unlimited 
business visa sponsorships,  
3 Indonesians for every expat 
hired 
Compliance Monthly withholding tax report, 
quarterly/semi-annual investment 
report 
Monthly withholding tax report, 
annual activity report to the 




10 weeks 6 weeks 
Estimated Costs ± USD $3,500 ± USD $2,000 
Table 1: Foreign Investment Company or Representative Office. Source: Indonesia 
Investments (2016) 
 
As can be seen in the table above, there are quite a few differences between the 
establishment of a PT PMA and a representative office. The choice therefore depends a 
lot on the type of business that will be conducted, as well as the sector the company 
operates within, based on the regulations stated in the Negative Investments List.  
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2.2.3 Indonesian Business Culture 
Working in Innovation Norway in Jakarta, having Indonesian colleagues, attending - and 
arranging business meetings and events, taught me a lot about Indonesian business 
culture and etiquette. My main observation was that Indonesians put great emphasis on 
personal relationships, even in business settings. A major key to success in negotiating a 
business partnership in Indonesia is therefore clear communication and the development 
of long-term relationships.  
 
When meeting someone for the first time in a business setting, it is common to introduce 
yourself with your full name and the name of your organisation. Business cards are 
exchanged immediately after introductions and should be presented with both hands. 
When addressing senior management in Indonesian companies, it is common to use the 
courtesy terms “Bapak‟ for male and “Ibu‟ for female. Meetings rarely start on time and 
guests often arrive late. Business dealings tend to be slow, but it is important to never 
loose your temper, as displays of impatience or rudeness is considered highly 
embarrassing.  
 
When sending out invitations to a meeting or and event, guests may not confirm their 
participation even if they intend to show up, or may confirm long after the deadline. Last 
minute cancellations of meetings are also common, so it is important to keep a high level 
of flexibility to accommodate last minute changes. English is normally used as the 
business language, as most of the educated Indonesians speak English quite well. 
However, a translator could be needed on some occasions, so bringing a native speaking 
partner with you when attending meetings is always a good idea. Potential Indonesian 
business partners may often be reluctant to provide information on turnover, competition, 
and market share before meeting in person, so travelling to the country to meet with 
possible partners is very important, even at an early stage of the establishment process. 
 
2.2.4 ASEAN 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was established on 8 August 
1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration by the founding 
nations: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (ASEAN, 2015). It 
now also includes Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia, 
making up what is today the ten Member States of ASEAN (ASEAN, 2015). 
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As set out in the ASEAN Declaration, the aims and purposes of ASEAN are to accelerate 
the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through 
joint endeavours, equality and partnership (ASEAN, 2015). ASEAN was founded to 
promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the 
economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields, and to provide 
assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, 
professional, technical and administrative spheres (ASEAN, 2015).  Another aim is to 
collaborate more effectively for the greater utilisation of their agriculture and industries, 
the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international 
commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communications facilities 
and the raising of the living standards of their peoples (ASEAN, 2015). Being a part of 
ASEAN is very important for the international trade and collaborations for Indonesia, as 
it is continuing to contribute to increased foreign direct investments and increased GDP 
growth in the country. 
 
2.3 Country Comparison - Norway and Indonesia 
In order to get a good overview of the similarities and differences between the two 
countries in question, a short country comparison has been made. 
 Norway Indonesia 
Population 5.136 Million 254.5 Million 
Surface Area 385,178 Km2 1,910,930 Km2 
Important Resources Petroleum, natural gas, nickel, 
hydropower, fish, timber, 
copper, bauxite, fertile soils, 
tin, coal, gold, silver 
Petroleum, natural gas, nickel, 
hydropower, fish, timber, 
copper, iron ore, lead, zinc, 
titanium, pyrites  
GDP $ 499.8 Billion $ 888.5 Billion 
GDP per Capita (PPP) $ 64,004 $ 10,033 
Annual GDP Growth 2.2 % 5.0 % 
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Income level High Income Lower Middle Income 
Currency Norwegian Krone Indonesian Rupiah 
Level of Corruption Low (87 of 100) High (36 of 100) 
Average Import time 7 days 26 days 
Government type Constitutional Monarchy Republic 
Main Religion Christianity (90.1 %) Islam (86.1 %) 
Table 2: Country Comparison - Norway and Indonesia. Sources: The World Bank (2016), 
Nation Master (2016) and Transparency International (2016). 
 
As can be seen in the table above, there are both similarities and differences between the 
two countries. Norway and Indonesia have many of the same natural resources, they both 
have closeness to the ocean and the maritime. While Indonesia has a much higher GDP 
than Norway, the large population makes for a significantly lower GDP per capita, along 
with a much lower income level. Indonesia also takes the lead in the annual GDP growth 
rate.  
 
Norway and Indonesia find themselves almost on opposite sides of the scale regarding 
the level of corruption. While Norway is considered to be “clean”, Indonesia is highly 
corrupt. Matters of import are also more complicated and time consuming in Indonesia 
than in Norway. Religious - and cultural differences may also have an impact on business 
relations, bearing in mind the actualities of today, but as most Indonesians practice a 
quite liberal branch of Islam, they are normally very open to other religions and cultures.   
 
2.4 Norwegian Business in Indonesia 
Innovation Norway's office in Jakarta was opened in 2012, as a part of the commercial 
sector of The Royal Norwegian Embassy. In an interview on 07.03.16 with Ole Schanke 
Eikum, the Managing Director of Innovation Norway Indonesia, he explained that they 
are now receiving a steady stream of inquiries from Norwegian companies that are 
interested in establishing business in Indonesia. According to Eikum, the number of 
Norwegian companies has also steadily increased throughout the years that he has been 
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there, stating that “The ones succeeding with establishing business give good feedback, 
and they are happy to take part in this fast growing economy.” 
 
Almost 60 Norwegian companies are now in some way established in Indonesia, and 
according to Eikum “We divide among direct establishment with a subsidiary, 
representative office or joint venture, representation through the use of an agent, and 
Norwegian companies that are only exporting. Due to Indonesian regulations, some 
Norwegian subsidiaries have a partly Indonesian ownership.” The different companies 
are displayed below in two presentations made by Innovation Norway.  
 
 




Figure 3: Norwegian Companies in Indonesia 2. Source: Innovation Norway (2016) 
 
Because of Indonesian law, the use of agents is according to Eikum widespread, 
especially for technology and device suppliers in the oil and gas sector. According to 
Eikum the most challenging part of establishment in Indonesia is the long time needed to 
enter the market. “You need to establish all permits and licenses, build a good network 
and participate in very long tender processes. The company's management and board of 
directors therefore need patience and stamina in order to get a breakthrough.”  
 
The two biggest sectors for Norwegian businesses today are according to Eikum the oil & 
gas sector and the maritime sector, with LNG (liquefied natural gas) being “a hot topic”. 
There is also increasing Norwegian interest in the sectors of renewable energy and fish 
farming. On the outlook for the future, with opportunities and challenges for Norwegian 
companies in Indonesia, Eikum stated “There are many interesting opportunities for 
Norwegian companies, but maybe I will mention the aquaculture sector as the most 




Figure 4: Norwegian Exports to Indonesia. Source: Innovation Norway (2015) 
 
As is shown by the figure above, Norwegian export to Indonesia has steadily increased 
since 2010. And over the last ten years, it has according to the Norwegian Government 
(2015), increased with more than 200%. Of this, a large amount came from the seafood 
industry (Norwegian Government, 2015).  
 
2.5 Market Opportunities for Norwegian companies 
EFTA (The European Free Trade Association) with its member states Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, have since January 2011 been negotiating a 
“Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement” with Indonesia (EFTA, 2016). In 
addition to trade in goods, the negotiations also include services, investments, trade 
facilitation, intellectual property rights, and sustainable development (The Norwegian 
Government, 2013). This agreement will improve market access for exports of 
Norwegian products, as well as services. Especially shipping services, energy related 
services and telecommunications are of priority to the Norwegian Government (The 
Norwegian Government, 2013).  
 
According to the Norwegian Minister of Industry Monica Mæland, “Indonesia is a 
market with great potential, but they have traditionally had a restrictive import policy. 
That’s challenging. A free trade agreement will facilitate more exports of goods and 
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services within a stable and predictable framework.” (The Norwegian Government, 
2015). 
 
2.5.1 Exports of Norwegian Seafood 
According to the Norwegian Seafood Council (2016), the value of Norwegian salmon 
exports has increased sharply during the last year. The average export price for fresh 
whole salmon was in February 2016 NOK 55.05 per kg. This was a price increase of 31% 
compared with the same month last year. As stated by Pål T. Aandahl, analyst for the 
Norwegian Seafood Council, “strong demand and a favourable foreign currency 
situation are driving the price for salmon and consequently the value to new heights” 
(Norwegian Seafood Council, 2016).  
 
In 2010 the total exports of Norwegian seafood to Indonesia was 881 tonnes, with a value 
of 39.2 million NOK. By 2012, these exports had more than doubled, to the whole of 
4095 tonnes with a value of NOK 89.6 million (Engø, 2013). Exports of salmon 
increased from 732 tonnes in 2010 to 2,036 tonnes in 2012 (Engø, 2013). In 2010, there 
was no export of mackerel to Indonesia. In 2011, the export was 669 tonnes, which more 
than doubled to 1546 tonnes in 2012 (Engø, 2013). 
 
According to research by Innovation Norway (2015), this increase in Norwegian seafood 
exports to Indonesia has been due to the growing middle class and affluent market in 
Indonesia, as well as an increased awareness of the quality of Norwegian Seafood 
(Innovation Norway, 2015). The most common species of Norwegian Seafood that are 
exported to Indonesia are Salmon, King crabs, Mussels, White fish and pelagic fish. 
Norwegian salmon holds around 70% of the market share of salmon in Indonesia, whilst 
the remaining share is accommodated by Tasmanian and Chilean Salmon (Innovation 
Norway, 2015). 
 
Cold storage facilities for fresh seafood products are available in big cities such as: 
Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan and Bali. Supermarket chains like Carrefour, Hero, Ranch 
Market, Food Hall, and Kemchicks, are playing important roles in displaying and selling 
good quality imported seafood products (Innovation Norway, 2015). In order for 
Norwegian companies to be able to export to Indonesia, the company must appoint a 
local importer with an import license number (Angka Pengenal Import) and Fish import 
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license (Innovation Norway, 2015). Meeting prospective partners face to face prior to the 
appointment is according to Innovation Norway (2015), essential in maximizing the 
potential in Indonesia. 
 
2.5.2 The Maritime and Aquaculture sectors 
Indonesia is as previously mentioned the worlds largest archipelagic country. It consists 
of 17,508 islands, with a coastline of 81,000 km and ocean areas of 5.8 million km2 
(Innovation Norway, 2012). The maritime and aquaculture sectors consequently play 
very important roles in the Indonesian economy. According to Innovation Norway 
(2012), aquafarming production in Indonesia is now growing with 30% annually. The 
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries in Indonesia has declared its commitment to 
becoming the world’s leading fish producer by expanding its aquaculture industry and 
allocate US$ 108 million to upgrade the infrastructure, and assist the local aquaculture 
industry (Innovation Norway, 2015). As the main species for Indonesian aquafarming is 
Barramundi and Tuna, this will not be in direct competition with Norwegian export 
products such as Salmon, Mackerel and King Crab. This commitment and increased 
focus on aquafarming and fisheries in Indonesia therefore represents great business 
opportunities for Norwegian suppliers of equipment, technology and knowledge of 
aquafarming, as well as the in the shipbuilding industry. 
 
Indonesia’s ports have good market potential for development both in terms of their 
number and capacity. Currently, Indonesia has 2,154 ports. On average there is one port 
for approximately each 40 kilometers of coastline in Indonesia (Sukaesi, 2015). Under 
the ASEAN Connectivity Master Plan, 14 Indonesian ports are being prioritized for 
construction. And in the future, 19 ports will be capable of accommodating ships with 
capacities of 5,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (Sukaesi, 2015). According to Sukaesi 
(2015), the domestic shipping fleet has more than doubled over the last eight years. With 
the Ministry’s plan to expand their maritime operations, a large fleet of ships with a big 
capacity will be required, with estimated investment in container ships of US$6.7 billion 
needed by 2030 (Sukaesi, 2015). This may also lead to business opportunities for 
Norwegian shipbuilding companies and maritime technology providers.  
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2.5.3 The Energy, Environment and Infrastructure sectors 
With more than 25 cities larger than Oslo and increasing urbanization, Indonesia faces 
some great challenges. One of the main problems for large cities such as the capital 
Jakarta is the increasing level of pollution. In an interview in The New York Times 
(2015), Dr. Budi Haryanto, chairman of the University of Indonesia’s Department of 
Environmental Health, said that air pollution causes 2.8 million lost work days a year, 
along with 1.3 million absences at schools, 9,000 hospitalizations and at least 6,500 
premature deaths. And according to data by the Indonesian Ministry of Health, the 
transportation sector contributes to between 70% and 80% of total outdoor air pollutants, 
with the number of vehicles in the city increasing with around 10% a year (New York 
Times, 2015).  
 
Having lived in this immense city, I quickly learned that most people do not use any form 
of public transportation. This is mainly due to the fact there does not actually exist a well 
functioning transit system there. Most people drive their own car or motorcycle, and the 
city is plagued by traffic congestion. As previously mentioned, the new government has 
made improvement of the infrastructure one of their main objectives. And according to 
Innovation Norway (2016), Indonesia plans to spend USD 464 billion on infrastructure 
development in the period 2015 – 2019. These investments can represent great 
opportunities for Norwegian businesses in the years to come, from the development of 
environmentally friendly transportation facilities to technologies for payment of toll roads 
and so forth. 
 
Although the electricity production has increased with around 13% annually the last three 
years, around 12 million households are still without electricity (Innovation Norway, 
2012). The annual electricity consumption is expected to increase to 375 TWh in 2020, 
and the state owned electricity company, PLN, is planning to invest US$ 9.6 billion/year 
until 2020 (Innovation Norway, 2012). Although the energy sector is centrally planned, 
private investors will according to Innovation Norway (2012) be able to play an 
increasingly significant role in the large investments that will take place in the years to 
come. Indonesia is favoured with a large amount of renewable energy sources, such as 
geothermal, biomass, and hydropower (Innovation Norway, 2012). Only a small portion 
of these energy sources is utilized today, and the business opportunities for Norwegian 
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companies may therefore consist of investing in renewable energy production and 
engineering, procurement and construction-contracts (Innovation Norway, 2012). 
 
2.5.4 The Oil and Gas sector 
A decline in Indonesia's oil production in combination with increased domestic demand 
turned Indonesia into a net oil importer from 2004 onward (Indonesia Investments, 2016). 
This decline in oil production was according to Indonesia Investments (2016) due to a 
lack of exploration and investments in this sector. This has according to Indonesia 
Investments (2016) been a result of weak government management, the high level of 
bureaucracy, an unclear regulatory framework and legal uncertainty regarding contracts. 
Due to a growing population, an expanding middle class and a growing economy, the 
demand for fuel is continuing to increase (Indonesia Investments, 2016). As domestic 
production cannot meet domestic demand, Indonesia now imports about 500,000 barrels 
of fuel per day (Indonesia Investments, 2016).  
 
While the oil production has been declining the last few years, there has been an increase 
of Indonesian gas production. Special Task Force for Upstream Oil and Gas Business 
Activities, SKK Migas have according to Innovation Norway (2012), stated that the 
supply of LNG for domestic consumption would be delivered from several big projects, 
including the Indonesia Deepwater Development (IDD) project by US-based Chevron 
and the Italian firm Eni. The IDD project is expected to begin production in 2018, with an 
expected output of 1.1 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas (Innovation Norway, 
2012).  
 
The increase of Indonesian gas production is very promising, and both state owned and 
private enterprises are currently exploring the solutions for distribution of natural gas 
(Innovation Norway, 2012). In this market there is according to Innovation Norway 





3. Theoretical Framework 
An overview of the most important theoretical aspects will now be presented, along with 
six propositions following the sub-chapters most relevant for each proposition.  
 
3.1 Entry Modes      
Sharma and Erramilli (2004, p. 268) defined an entry mode as “a structural agreement 
that allows a firm to implement its product market strategy in a host country either by 
carrying out only the marketing operations, or both production and marketing operations 
there by itself or in partnership with others”. Root (1994, in Ekeledo & Sivakumar, 2004 
p. 1) additionally put a time frame on the term when he explained an entry mode as “an 
institutional arrangement that a firm uses to market its product in a foreign market in the 
first three to five years”. 
 
Selecting an entry mode is one of the most important strategic decisions that a company 
has to make when entering a new market - so important that it according to Tian (2007), 
may determine the company’s success or failure. To compete with the companies that are 
already established in the host country, the entering companies also need to possess 
superior resources and capabilities that can generate high enough profits to counter the 
costs of servicing these markets (Tian, 2007).  
 
There are many ways or modes by which an international company can enter a new 
market, such as exporting, licensing, franchising, strategic alliances, joint ventures, and 
wholly owned subsidiaries (Tian, 2007). According to Brouthers and Hennart (2007), 
exporting, licensing and franchising are often referred to as contractual entry modes, 
while wholly owned subsidiaries and joint ventures are referred to as direct entry modes.  
 
3.1.1 Exporting, Licensing and Franchising 
Exporting is the process of selling goods and services produced in one country to other 
countries (Yadong, 1999). It is normal to divide between direct and indirect exporting. 
Direct exports is the most basic mode of exporting, where a company produces its 
products based on economies of scale in the home country and sells the excess products 
abroad, keeping a high level of control over the product distribution in the foreign 
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markets (Cullen & Parboteeah, 2011). Indirect exporting is the process of exporting 
through domestically based intermediaries in the foreign market of choice. In this case, 
the exporter has no control over its products once it is located in the foreign market 
(Cullen & Parboteeah, 2011).  
 
According to Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992), the exporting mode is a low resource  - 
and consequently low risk alternative. And one of the advantages of exporting is the level 
of control over the selection of foreign markets and the choice of foreign distributors. 
Exporting also gives a better protection of trademarks, patents, goodwill, and other 
intangible property. Additionally, there is a potential for greater sales, and therefore 
greater profits, as the costs are mostly related to marketing (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 
1992).  
 
In the case of licensing, an international licensing agreement allows foreign firms, either 
exclusively or non-exclusively to manufacture a company’s product in a specific market 
(Hill, Kim & Hwang, 1990). The licensee then bears most of the cost related to entering 
and serving the foreign market. The level of resource commitment from the company is 
therefore low, and is limited only to training the licensees and personnel involved in 
monitoring their business operations (Hill, Kim & Hwang, 1990).  
 
Compared to licensing, franchising agreements tends to have a longer time horizon, and 
the franchisor offers a broader package of rights and resources which usually includes 
equipment, managerial systems, operation manual, initial trainings, site approval and all 
the support necessary for the franchisee to run its business in the same way as it is done 
by the franchisor (Hoy & Stanworth, 2003). However, while a licensing agreement 
involves intellectual property, trade secrets and other similar factors, in franchising this is 
limited to trademarks and the operational “know-how” of the business (Hoy & 
Stanworth, 2003).  
      
 
3.1.2 Strategic Alliances  
A strategic alliance is a cooperative agreement between companies, with shared research, 
formal joint ventures, or minority equity participation (Isenberg, 2008). The focus is 
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often on creating new products or technologies rather than distributing existing ones. 
Strategic alliances are often created for short-term durations or projects (Isenberg, 2008). 
 
3.1.3 Joint Ventures and Wholly owned Subsidiaries  
According to Kogut and Singh (1988) Acquisition refers to the purchase of stock in an 
already existing company in a sufficient amount to get control. A Greenfield investment 
is a start-up investment in new facilities, and such an investment can be wholly owned or 
a joint venture (Kogut & Singh, 1988). A joint venture is the pooling of assets in a 
common and separate organization by two or more firms who share joint ownership and 
control over the use and fruits of these assets (Kogut & Singh, 1988). The joint venture 
mode involves relatively low resource commitment and therefore provides risk, return, 
and control equivalent to the extent of the equity participation of the investing firm 
(Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992). In the case of a wholly owned subsidiary, the company 
bears all the costs and risks of entering and serving the market, and owns all the revenue 
generating assets (Hill, Kim & Hwang, 1990).  
 
3.2 Perspectives on Entry Modes     
3.2.1 Transaction Cost Theory and The Resource-based view 
A large number of theories have been used to explain the entry mode choice decision, and 
among the most commonly applied are according to Brouthers and Hennart (2007), the 
transaction cost theory and the resource-based view. 
 
The transaction cost theory is as discussed by Williamson (1989), a theory accounting for 
the actual cost of outsourcing production or services. A transaction cost is a cost 
sustained in the making an economic exchange, or in other words, the cost of 
participating in a market (Williamson, 1989). According to Williamson (1989), 
transaction cost theory stresses the importance of proprietary assets possessed by 
companies, such as patents, knowledge, products, processes, brand name, product 
differentiation, and marketing skills. 
 
According to Gollnhofer and Turkina (2015), entry mode choice based on the transaction 
cost theory argues that managers suffer from a bounded rationality where potential 
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partners may act opportunistically, and that this contributes to the choice of an entry 
mode with a higher level of control. Using a database of foreign investment in China 
from 1979 to 1992, Chen and Hu (2002) found that the hypothesized effects of 
transaction cost factors on entry modes were supported, and that the wholly owned 
subsidiaries were more likely to be chosen than contractual modes when the investments 
involved marketing skills and long planned duration. They also found that the foreign 
investment projects whose modes were selected according to the prescription of the 
transaction cost theory were more successful than those whose modes were selected 
otherwise (Chen & Hu, 2002). 
 
The resource-based view is a term used when talking about the collection of valuable 
resources at the company's disposal that can be considered a basis for the competitive 
advantage of the company (Meyer, Wright & Pruthi, 2009). According to Meyer et al. 
(2009), research of the resource-based view shows that the choice of entry mode often 
depends on the company’s existing capabilities as well as the resources it would like to 
acquire (Meyer, Wright & Pruthi, 2009). The company’s current resources - or lack 
thereof, consequently has an impact on the choice of entry mode, as different entry modes 
offer different approaches to benefiting from the local resources.  
 
3.2.2 The Process of Internationalization 
When developing their theory of internationalization, Johanson and Vahlne (1977) 
connected the process by which a firm proceeds from exporting to joint venture and 
wholly owned subsidiaries to the reduction in perceived risk regarding the foreign 
market, as the firm acquires more experience. Johanson and Vahlne (1977) came up with 
a model to explain their view on the process of internationalization. 
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Figure 5: The Mechanisms of Internationalization. Source: Johanson and Vahlne (1977) 
  
According to Johanson and Vahlne (1977) the model assumes that the state of 
internationalization affects perceived opportunities and risks, which in turn influence 
commitment decisions and current activities. Johanson and Vahlne (1977) suggested that 
when establishing international operations, companies need accurate market knowledge, 
which comes from direct experience in the foreign market, rather than the more objective 
and general market information that is attained without personal experience. This means 
that firms can be expected to first enter nearby markets with a low psychic distance, 
because these countries often have similar language, culture, political system, level of 
education, and level of industrial development (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Once a 
company has acquired more knowledge about how to operate internationally, it will 
according to Johanson & Vahlne (1977), be more inclined to enter countries with a 
greater psychic distance. 
 
Barkema, Bell and Pennings (1996) discussed Johanson and Vahlne’s (1977) model, and 
argued that although the model gives a good prediction of a company’s successive stages 
of internationalization, exceptions may occur. They use the example of when firms 
already have considerable experience from other, culturally similar markets.  
 
3.2.3 Characteristics of Entry Mode Choices 
As is shown in the figure below, Hill, Kim and Hwang (1990) presented three different 
constructs that characterises the three main choices of entry modes: the level of control, 
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the level of resource commitment, and the level of dissemination risk (risk related to a 
lack of communication).  
 
Figure 6: Characteristics of Entry Modes. Source: Hill, Kim and Hwang (1990) 
 
As we can see, licensing has according to Hill et. al (1990), a low level of control, a low 
resource commitment, and a high level of dissemination risk, while wholly owned 
subsidiaries have high levels of control and resource commitment, and a lower level of 
dissemination risk. Joint venturing is located in the middle of the two, with medium 
levels of all the constructs. Hill, Kim and Hwang (1990), argued that the company’s level 
of resource commitment has a large impact on the strategic flexibility of the company 
when choosing a mode of entry. This flexibility could according to the authors be 
regarded as highest in the case of licensing, and lowest in the case of a wholly owned 
subsidiary (Hill et al., 1990).  
 
According to Brouthers and Hennart (2007), there appear to be two main views in the 
literature on the meaning of entry modes and the differences among contractual entry 
modes (export, licensing and franchising), and direct entry modes (joint ventures, and 
wholly owned subsidiaries). The first view is expressed by a number of authors and 
arranges exporting, licensing, franchising, strategic alliances, joint ventures, and wholly 
owned subsidiaries along a continuum of increasing control, commitment, and risk (e.g. 
Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Erramilli & Rao, 1990; Hill, Hwang, & Kim, 1990 in 
Brouthers & Hennart, 2007).  
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Figure 7: Entry Modes, Control, Commitment and Risk. Source: Study Blue (2015) 
 
 As shown graphically in the figure below, exporting is characterised by low levels of 
risk, commitment and control, while a subsidiary is chosen when firms want maximum 
control, are willing to make maximum commitment and to take on maximum risk.  
 
The second perspective is expressed by Hennart (1988a, 1989, 2000, in Brouthers & 
Hennart, 2007). He does not view joint ventures as a step in the continuum between 
contracts and wholly owned subsidiaries but instead classifies modes of entry into two 
categories: contracts and equity, with exporting, licensing and franchising in the contract 
category and joint ventures and subsidiaries in the equity category. According to Hennart 
(2000, in Brouthers & Hennart, 2007), the main difference in entry modes lies in the 
method chosen to compensate input providers. The fundamental characteristic of equity is 
that input suppliers are paid based on the actual results of the venture, in contrast to 
contracts, where payments are specified based on forecasts (Hennart, 2000, in Brouthers 
& Hennart, 2007).  
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Throughout this thesis, the first perspective, articulated through a continuum of 
increasing control, risk and resource commitment, will be used as the main basis for the 
entry mode theory, since this is the most theoretically grounded perspective.  
  
3.2.4 Norwegian companies’ Entry Mode Choices 
In their study of Norwegian multinational companies’ activities in Sweden, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Spain, Poland, Japan, and the United States, Randøy and Dibrell (2002) 
made several findings that are relevant for this thesis. One of their main findings was that 
the companies with a strategic objective of getting access to skills and capabilities were 
more inclined to use high resource commitment foreign market entry modes. They also 
found that international experience was an important factor, and that the Norwegian 
companies with extensive international experience had significantly higher resource 
commitments than the less experienced ones (Randøy & Dibrell, 2002). Their findings 
also proved that smaller companies or divisions serving the foreign markets were 
constrained by their size (Randøy & Dibrell, 2002). According to the authors, “this 
suggests that less experienced firms are constrained in their ability to manage larger 
foreign market commitments” (Randøy & Dibrell, 2002, p. 134).  
 
Randøy and Dibrell (2002) also found that perceived cultural distance increased the use 
of high foreign market resource commitments. The authors argued that this unfamiliarity 
effect has more to do with the choice of foreign market, rather than the actual serving of 
that particular market. Randøy and Dibrell (2002, p. 135) therefore stated, “If a division 
chose to operate in an unfamiliar environment, then the divisions might want a high 
degree of control, which to a large extent implies a substantial resource commitment.”  
 
3.2.5 Proposition 1  
The first proposition is established based on the findings of Hill, Kim & Hwang (1990), 
and Brouthers & Hennart (2007), as well as several other authors, that entry modes can 
be arranged along a continuum of increasing control, commitment, and risk, where low 
levels of control, risk and commitment indicates the choice of exporting, and high levels 
of control, risk and commitment indicates the choice of a subsidiary. Additionally, with 
the findings of Randøy and Dibrell (2002) in their study of Norwegian companies in 
foreign markets, that those operating in unfamiliar environments preferred a high degree 
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of control, the following proposition has been made to find further empirical evidence of 
this.  
 
P1: A high perceived need for management control indicates the choice of a subsidiary. 
 
3.3 Cultural Distance, Risk and International Experience 
3.3.1 Cultural Distance 
In the last few decades, international business research has made extensive use of the 
concept of cultural distance to explain the expansion behaviour and the related success of 
multinational companies (Drogendijk & Slangen, 2006). According to Zhao, Luo and Suh 
(2004), cultural distance and country risk are the two most common causes of external 
uncertainty, and Gollnhofer and Turkina (2015) stated that differences in local cultures 
go in hand with differences in organizational and administrative practices. O’Grady and 
Lane (1996) argued that perceived similarity can cause decision makers to fail because 
they do not prepare for the differences between cultures when entering a foreign market, 
stating that “more attention needs to be paid to the perception of similarity and 
difference, as well as to the decision making process regarding entry” (O’Grady and 
Lane, 1996, p. 314).   
 
Culture is often defined as the homogeneity of characteristics that separate one human 
group from another (Gollnhofer & Turkina, 2015). And as discussed by Hofstede (1980), 
each culture incorporates fundamental norms, values and institutions. Cultural distance 
has been measured in various ways, including the cultural dimensions by Hofstede 
(1980), and the index developed by Kogut and Singh (1988). Drogendijk and Slangen 
(2006) discuss Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions, and whether his findings are still relevant 
in the 21st century. Their research indicates that Hofstede’s measures of national cultural 
distance do explain establishment mode choices by multinational enterprises, but that the 
explanatory power of the measure is somewhat low (Drogendijk & Slangen, 2006). Smith 
(2006) argued that the study of culture as it applies in an international business context 
must move beyond Hofstede’s dimensions toward a “more qualitative analyses of 
culture” (Smith, 2006, p. 915). Additionally, as stated by Sackmann and Phillips (2004 
p.378) “organizations may be home to, and carriers of, several cultures”. 
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López-Duarte and Vidal-Suárez (2013) conducted an extensive research on cultural 
distance and the choice between wholly owned subsidiaries and joint ventures. Their 
results indicate that increased cultural distance leads to differences related to values, 
norms and behavioural rules which makes it more difficult to search for potential 
partners, conduct the negotiation process, and later enforce contracts (López-Duarte and 
Vidal-Suárez, 2013). In particular, their results point towards language differences as a 
deciding factor. According to López-Duarte and Vidal-Suárez (2013), when investing 
through a joint venture, the potential role the local partner plays in reducing external 
uncertainty critically depends on the relationship with the foreign investor. Therefore, 
when language diversity exists, the foreign investors will prefer to invest through wholly 
owned subsidiaries and avoid collaborating with a local partner (López-Duarte and Vidal-
Suárez, 2013). Their results also hint at the existence of an interaction effect between 
cultural distance and political risk, leading to a preference for joint ventures over wholly 
owned subsidiaries when the environment is characterized by both high political risk and 
cultural distance (López-Duarte & Vidal-Suárez, 2013).  
 
Cultural distance in a business setting has also often been viewed as psychic distance, 
which was described by Johanson and Vahlne (1977, p. 24) as “the sum of factors 
preventing the flow of information to and from the market. Examples are differences in 
language, education, business practices, culture, and industrial development.”  
 
The term psychic distance was also used by Ojala (2008) in his study of Finnish 
companies in Japan. His findings indicate that psychic distance is based on a manager’s 
personal experiences and feelings about how distant a country is, rather than on actual 
cultural differences between the two countries (Ojala, 2008). Ojala (2008) also found 
that, despite a psychic distance between Finland and Japan, most of the firms entered 
Japan at a very early stage of their internationalization process, and did so by using direct 
entry modes. According to Ojala (2008, p. 1) “this was mainly due to the market size, 
sophisticated industry structure, and requirements for intensive cooperation with the 
customers during the sales process”. The firms were, as described by Ojala (2008) able 
to overcome psychic distance by hiring local employees and by using western managers 
who already had working experience in the Japanese market.  
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3.3.2 Risk and Uncertainty 
As discussed by Chen and Hu (2002) and Kogut and Singh (1988), a high cultural 
distance leads to higher transaction costs and higher uncertainty, which consequently 
leads to higher perceived risk. According to Slangen and Tulder (2009), it is well 
accepted that multinational companies prefer joint ventures to wholly owned subsidiaries 
in foreign countries where the formal and informal external environment is highly 
uncertain. According to Slangen and Tulder (2009), several studies have used the level of 
political risk in foreign countries as a substitute for the amount of external uncertainty. 
“Political risk refers to the likelihood of an unfavourable change in the governmental 
regime of a country or in the policies issued by this regime” (Henisz, 2000; Miller, 1992 
in Slangen & Tulder, 2009, p. 279). According to Slangen and Tulder (2009), the higher 
level of political risk, the higher the tendency is of multinational companies to enter the 
foreign market through low control modes, rather than high control modes. 
 
Dikova and van Witteloostuijn (2007) found that there needs to be a satisfactory level of 
institutional advancement in the foreign market for the company to be willing to establish 
high resource and high control operations, as it would otherwise become too expensive to 
be sufficiently protected against issues like violation of property rights. First hand 
knowledge of a foreign market’s formal and informal institutions is therefore according 
to Barkema, Bell and Pennings (1996), a critical resource, as this kind of knowledge is 
not easily acquired. Barkema et. al (1996) therefore argued that a local partner - be it a 
joint venture or an agent, is required, especially during the early stages of the market 
entry, to avoid the issues as previously described. This would be particularly important in 
markets where there is still an unsatisfactory level of institutional advancement. 
 
3.3.3 Proposition 2 
Based on the theory discussed in this chapter, it is clear that cultural distance is a factor 
that has an impact on the choice of entry mode, but also a factor that is difficult to 
operationalize without using old and perhaps outdated measurements. As argued by Ojala 
(2008), this distance can also be based on a manager’s personal experiences and feelings 
about how distant a country is, rather than on the actual cultural differences between the 
two countries. Similar to Ojala (2008), the concept of perceived cultural distance was 
used by Randøy and Dibrell (2002) in their study of Norwegian companies abroad. As 
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this concept seems to be the most suitable for this research, the level of perceived cultural 
distance will therefore be used to measure cultural distance in this thesis.  
 
As discussed by Chen & Hu (2002) and Kogut & Singh (1988), a high cultural distance 
leads to higher transaction costs and higher uncertainty, which consequently leads to 
higher perceived risk. And as presented in chapter 3.2.3 by Hill, Kim & Hwang (1990), 
and Brouthers & Hennart (2007), the level of risk increases along a continuum from 
contractual modes to direct entry modes, with the choice of a subsidiary indicating that 
the company wants maximum control, is willing to make maximum commitment, and to 
take on maximum risk. Based on this, the following proposition has been made.  
 
P2: The choice of a direct entry mode leads to high levels of perceived cultural distance 
and risk for the company.  
 
3.3.4 Proposition 3 
As have been suggested by Barkema, Bell and Pennings (1996), the level of risk and 
uncertainty can be reduced by having knowledge about the specific market, which can be 
achieved by having a local partner or agent. To find more empirical evidence of this, the 
following proposition has been made. 
 
P3: A high level of perceived risk and uncertainty indicates the choice of a local partner 
in the establishment stage. 
 
3.3.5 International Experience 
According to Koch (2001), international experience plays a major role in shaping the 
company’s strategic directions, corporate culture, and knowledge. Without the sufficient 
and relevant experience and knowledge there is according to Koch (2001), a stronger 
sense of risk and uncertainty involved in the global marketing decisions, which in turn 
constrains the company’s freedom of entry mode choice.  
 
Typically, international experience is considered an indicator of low levels of internal 
uncertainty (Dow & Larimo, 2009). In terms of being a predictor variable, international 
experience has according to Dow and Larimo (2009) been the most frequently employed 
construct in the entry mode literature. And as found by Dow and Larimo (2009), 
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international experience is relevant to entry mode selection because experience has the 
potential to reduce the cost and increase the effectiveness of the monitoring of agents, 
which reduces risk and makes a higher level of control more attractive. As discussed by 
Dow and Larimo (2009 p. 79), there are two types of experience that are relevant when 
looking at entry mode decision-making: “General International Experience”, and 
“Culture Specific Experience”. The distinction between these two types of experience is 
directly parallel to Johanson and Vahlne’s (1977, p. 28) “general knowledge” and 
“market-specific knowledge”, which formed the basis of their internationalization 
process theory. 
 
Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004) talk about geographic experience and industry 
experience, where geographic experience comes from a firm’s familiarity within a 
specific region of the world in which the target foreign market is located. This is quite 
similar to Dow and Larimo’s (2009) culture specific experience. Industry experience is 
according to Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004) a function of a firm’s age in its own 
industry, and the extent of the firm’s knowledge about its industry’s functions in other 
countries. A firm that possesses both substantial industry experience and geographic 
experience will, according to Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004), favour a full ownership 
entry mode. 
 
Managers who possess international experience often perceive international endeavours 
with greater clarity than those less experienced (Oviatt & McDougall 1995, in Randøy & 
Dibrell, 2002). According to Randøy and Dibrell (2002) the less experienced companies 
will prefer low commitment modes, such as exporting. And as it acquires more 
international experience, the company will as discussed by Johanson and Vahlne (1977) 
tend to move more towards direct investments, and a higher level of resource 
commitment.  
 
3.3.6 Proposition 4 
This proposition is based on the findings of Dikova and van Witteloostuijn (2007), Dow 
and Larimo (2009), Barkema, Bell and Pennings (1996), and Ekeledo and Sivakumar 
(2004) that culture specific experience comes from a firm’s familiarity within a specific 
region of the world, in which the foreign target market is located, and that this experience 
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is relevant to entry mode selection because it has the potential to reduce country risk and 
make higher levels of control more attractive. Similar to Dow and Larimo (2009) the 
term culture specific experience will be used in this thesis. Hence, the following 
proposition has been made.  
 
P4: There is a reduction in perceived country risk as the firm acquires more culture 
specific experience. 
 
3.5 Company Size, Resource Commitment and Sector 
3.5.1 Company Size 
As discussed by Tian (2007), a firm’s asset power is reflected by its size, multinational 
experience, skills, and ability to develop differentiated products. And according to 
Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004, p. 78), “the size of a firm is often an indicator of its 
competitive advantage in financial, physical, human, technological, or organizational 
resources”. A large firm size therefore reflects a firm’s ability to absorb the high 
transaction costs involved in international expansion (Buckley and Casson, 1976 in 
Ekeledo & Sivakumar, 2004). Additionally, empirical evidence indicates a positive 
relationship between large firm size and wholly owned entry modes (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976; Terpstra and Yu, 1988; Caves and Mehra, 1986; Kimura, 1989; Yu and 
Ito, 1988, in Ekeledo & Sivakumar, 2004).  
 
Based on their own research, Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004) found that managers tended 
to make entry mode decisions based on considerations of firm-specific resources that 
would give the firm competitive advantage in the foreign market, as well as enhancing 
their resources. A large firm that possesses substantial industry experience will therefore, 
according to Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004), favour a full ownership entry mode. 
 
3.5.2 Resource Commitment 
According to Gollnhofer and Turkina (2015), entry mode strategies can be placed on a 
continuum going from relatively low resource commitment (export, licensing, and 
franchising,) to high resource commitment (joint venture and subsidiary). Gollnhofer and 
Turkina (2015) also found that in cases of high cultural distance, the probability of 
opportunism increases, and multinational companies will therefore be expected to choose 
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a high resource commitment entry mode to control their foreign affiliates more 
effectively.  
 
However, companies operating in markets abroad can according to Kogut and Singh 
(1988), be expected to prefer a low resource commitment entry mode, like exporting or 
franchising, to deal with the additional costs of expanding to foreign markets. And as 
argued by Kim and Hwang (1992), low resource commitment entry modes enable 
companies to withdraw easily from the host market in the case of failure, as high resource 
commitments contribute to the creation of an exit barrier.  
 
Evidently, the views on resource commitment and entry mode choice seem to differ quite 
greatly. However the most recent view of Gollnhofer and Turkina (2015), which is based 
on a thorough literary review, that high resource commitment can be related to high 
control entry modes, seems to be the most probable. As discussed by Kogut and Singh 
(1988) and Kim and Hwang (1992) high cost of expanding indicates the choice of 
contractual modes, however, these costs could be considered much less of a barrier for 
companies that have a substantial amount of financial resources and industry experience.  
 
3.5.3 Proposition 5 
This proposition is based on the findings of Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004), that large 
companies have a larger abundance of capabilities that creates competitive advantages 
such as increased knowledge, experience, and financial resources, and the findings of 
Randøy and Dibrell (2002) that large companies will prefer a high degree of control over 
the foreign operations and a substantial resource commitment. Additionally, the 
proposition is based on the findings of Gollnhofer and Turkina (2015) that entry mode 
strategies can be placed on a continuum going from relatively low resource commitment 
(export, licensing, franchising) to high resource commitment (joint venture, subsidiary), 
and the arguments of Kogut and Singh (1988), and Kim and Hwang (1992) that high 
levels of resource commitment would indicate the need for a substantial amount for 
financial resources to deal with the additional costs of direct investments.  
 
P5: Large companies are more inclined to choose high resource commitment modes than 
small companies.  
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3.5.4 Business Sector 
According to research by Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004 p. 80), “the firm’s industrial 
sector has enormous influence on the mode of operation the firm uses in a foreign 
market”. Bell (1995, in Ojala, 2008) found in his study of Finnish, Irish and Norwegian 
companies, that the companies’ internationalization behaviour was more related to 
industry specific characteristics than to psychic distance between countries. And 
according to the findings of Ojala (2008), companies in high-technology sectors were 
more inclined to internationalize into foreign markets than other sectors. 
 
Capital intensity may also be an indicator of differences between sectors, as discussed by 
Brouthers and Brouthers (2003). According to Brouthers and Brouthers (2003), capital 
intensity varies across industries from low levels in consulting, architecture, engineering, 
and other “knowledge-based industries”, to high levels in hotel, airline, 
telecommunication, electricity and energy, and other “capital intensive industries” 
(Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003).  
 
Sanchez-Peinado and Pla-Barber (2006) carried out a research to determine if differences 
in business types were linked to different behaviour patterns in the entry mode choice. 
Their main finding was that companies in knowledge-intensive industries preferred 
higher control entry modes than companies in capital-intensive industries when faced 
with conditions of country risk and cultural uncertainty (Sanchez-Peinado & Pla-Barber, 
2006). They also found that capital-intensive companies preferred flexible entry modes 
that could permit quick responses to technological changes within the sector (Sanchez-
Peinado & Pla-Barber, 2006). 
 
In a study by Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner (2002), they look at how differences 
between service and manufacturing firms influence entry mode strategy. They found a 
statistically significant difference, with results indicating that manufacturing firms were 
more likely to choose joint ventures, while service firms were more likely to choose 
wholly owned subsidiaries (Brouthers et. al (2002). They also found that macroeconomic 
risk had an impact on service firm strategy but not manufacturing firm strategy 
(Brouthers et. al (2002).  
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3.5.5 Proposition 6 
Based on the findings of Ojala (2008), Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004), the company’s 
business sector seems to have an impact on the choice of entry mode. And according to 
Sanchez-Peinado and Pla-Barber (2006), and Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner (2002), 
there are also differences between manufacturing and service companies, as well as 
between knowledge-intensive and capital-intensive industries. As previous research on 
the relationship between business sectors and entry mode choice was quite limited, the 
following proposition was made in order to further investigate this.  
 






4. Method and Data Collection 
4.1 Conceptual Framework 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 18) defined a conceptual framework as “a visual or 
written product that explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the main things to 
be studied - the key factors, concepts, or variables - and the presumed relationships 
among them.” 
 
The objective of this thesis is to identify the main factors that have an impact on 
Norwegian companies’ choice of entry mode when establishing business in the 
Indonesian market. The research of the thesis therefore has an explorative, inductive 
reasoning. As previously mentioned, the problem statement is as follows: What are the 
main factors affecting the choice of entry mode for Norwegian companies in the 
Indonesian market?  
 
Based on the problem statement and the previous theoretical and empirical findings 
presented in chapter 3, the following propositions were developed: 
 
P1: A high perceived need for management control indicates the choice of a subsidiary. 
P2: The choice of a direct entry mode leads to high levels of perceived cultural distance 
and risk for the company.  
P3: A high level of perceived risk and uncertainty indicates the choice of a local partner 
in the establishment stage. 
P4: There is a reduction in perceived country risk as the firm acquires more culture 
specific experience. 
P5: Large companies are more inclined to choose high resource commitment modes than 
small companies.  
P6: There are differences between business sectors when it comes to the choice of entry 
mode. 
 
Based on the problem statement, the theoretical framework and the propositions, the main 
factors affecting the choice of entry mode to be considered are found to be: perceived 
need for management control, level of resource commitment, level of international 
(culture specific) experience, perceived cultural distance, business sector, and company 
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size. The different entry mode options are: exporting, licensing, franchising, strategic 
alliance, joint venture, and wholly owned subsidiary. To get a clear overview and 
understanding of the relationships between these concepts, a figurative research model 
have been made.  
 
Figure 8: The Research Model 
 
The aim of this research was to get a deeper understanding of the different factors related 
to the choice of entry mode for Norwegian companies in Indonesia, by comparing 
previous findings with the results of this thesis. Therefore, to effectively and 
informatively understand the more complexity and dynamic of these concepts, a 
qualitative research method was chosen.   
 
4.2 Qualitative Research Method 
While quantitative research emphasizes numbers and mathematical modelling for the 
creation of standardized and generalized results, qualitative research is designed to help 
researchers get a deeper understanding of the social and cultural contexts that people live 
in (Myers, 2013). The chosen research method in this master thesis is a qualitative 
research method, and there are several reasons for this choice. First of all, the main 
objective was as previously mentioned, to get a deeper understanding of the choices of 
Norwegian companies entering a new and foreign market. A quantitative approach would 
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only graze the surface of this topic, and not provide the necessary depth of understanding. 
Secondly, the production of statistical data and key-numbers were not an aim in this 
thesis. The main goal was to generate descriptive, empirical findings that could be used 
as a tool for Norwegian companies when entering a foreign market such as Indonesia.     
 
According to Sekaran and Bougie (2013), qualitative research may involve repeated 
sampling, collection of data, and analysis of data, and is therefore not a step-by-step, 
linear process. Qualitative data sources may according to Myers (2013, p. 8) include 
“observations, fieldwork, interviews, questionnaires, documents and texts, and the 
researcher’s impressions and reactions”. While the data collection process is undertaken, 
the data that have already been collected can be analysed right away, which can lead to 
new ideas and understandings throughout the process (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). And as 
qualitative data collection produces large amounts of data, the first step in the data 
analysis is therefore to reduce and comprise the data through categorization to help the 
researcher to draw meaningful conclusions about the data (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013).  
 
As mentioned, the primary motive for conducting qualitative research is the ability to 
give a deeper understanding of why a certain action is executed. To get a more extensive 
look into the selection of companies, and to better understand the complexity of motives 
for each company, the main method within qualitative research was chosen to be a case 
study research.  
 
4.2.1 Case Study Research 
In a case study, the researcher “uses empirical evidence from real people in 
contemporary real-life organizations” (Myers, 2013, p. 76). The case study researcher 
seeks according to Myers (2013) to understand how and why a particular business 
decision was made, or how and why a business process works the way it does.  
 
According to Yin (2014, p. 3), a case study allows the investigator to focus on a “case” 
and “retain a holistic and real-world perspective, such as by studying group behaviour, 
international relations, organizational and managerial processes”. As discussed by Yin 
(2014, p. 2), a case study research would be the preferred method “when the main 
research questions are how and why questions, the researcher has little or no control 
over behavioural events, and when the focus of the study is a contemporary rather than 
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historical phenomenon”.  The aim of this thesis was to understand the factors that have 
an impact on the managerial processes of decision making related to the choice of entry 
modes in new and foreign markets, which makes it suitable for a case study. The research 
focus for the thesis is also a contemporary, rather than historical phenomenon, and the 
researcher has little control over behavioural events.  
 
According to Darke, Shanks and Broadbent (1998, p. 280), “the design and scope of a 
case study research project requires a comprehensive literature analysis to be 
undertaken in order to understand the existing body of research literature within the 
research area and to position the research question(s) within the context of that 
literature”. Depending on the depth and range of the existing literature on the subject, the 
initial focus of the case study can, as discussed by Hartley (2004), be either narrow and 
defined, or broad and open-ended. One of the strengths of case study research is 
according to Hartley (2004) that it allows for theory development that is grounded in 
empirical evidence, which makes it well suited to the exploration of issues in depth and 
of following leads into new constructions of theory.  
 
Relying on theoretical propositions is as discussed by Yin (2014) a good strategy for 
analysing case studies. The theoretical framework should according to Yin (2014), guide 
the analysis because the theoretical propositions that have formed the design of the case 
study will help the researcher to focus attention on the data that is actually important for 
the case. Comparing empirical data with the initially predicted results that have been 
found, and exploring if the expected patterns are present or absent is also a good analysis 
technique (Yin, 2014).  
 
Based on the arguments of Yin (2014), the collected data in this thesis will be analysed 
and discussed with regards to each of the six, theoretically grounded propositions. The 
findings of the case study will also be compared to previous empirical findings in order to 
find out if the propositions can be considered empirically grounded – or if more research 
on the subject will be necessary.  
 
According to Darke, Shanks and Broadbent (1998), the number of cases to be studied 
depends on the focus of the research question. While single cases provide for in-depth 
investigation and rich description, multiple cases allow for theoretical replication and 
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case comparisons. As argued by Yin (2014), it is easier to draw conclusions and see 
patterns if the research consists of multiple cases. Based on the reasoning of Darke, 
Shanks and Broadbent (1998) and Yin (2014), this case study was chosen to consist of 
multiple cases, rather than a single case. This was also due to an interest in finding 
similarities and differences between the companies, and the aspiration of being able to 
draw more generalized conclusions that could potentially be of aid for a broader range of 
companies planning to enter the Indonesian market.    
 
As discussed by Darke, Shanks and Broadbent (1998), effective and efficient data 
collection for case study research requires careful planning and smart use of both the case 
participants' and the researcher's time. As collecting data from case participants can be 
difficult and time-consuming, researchers should have sufficient background information 
about each case prior to commencing the data collection  (Cavaye, 1996).  According to 
Myers (2013), a disadvantage with case studies is that it can be difficult to get access to 
the relevant people in the companies that one wishes to study, because the companies 
may be sceptical to whether the research will be of value and relevance to them. To 
increase the probability of receiving positive answers from the selected companies for 
this case study, a letter of introduction was provided by the researcher’s former employer 
in Innovation Norway Indonesia. This letter of introduction encouraged participation in 
the case study, and stated that the results of the thesis would be of use to Innovation 
Norway’s work in Indonesia, as well as for the companies that were currently operating 
there. This letter was attached to the introductory email that was sent to the companies.  
 
According to Yin (2014), there are several sources of evidence for case studies such as 
documents, archival records, interviews, researcher observations and so on. Yin (2014) 
further argues that interviews contribute to the best access of the participants' views and 
interpretations of actions and events, and should be the primary data source when case 
study research is undertaken. Myers (2013) is of the same opinion, stating that the most 
common technique for collecting data in a case study is by doing interviews, and that an 
interview is “an excellent window into an organization” (Myers, 2013, p. 81).   
 
4.2.2 Interviewing 
“Interviewing is a qualitative research technique that involves conducting individual 
interviews with a small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on a 
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particular idea, program, or situation” (Boyce & Neale, 2006, p. 3). According to Boyce 
and Neale (2006) the primary advantage of interviews is that they provide much more 
detailed information than what is available through other data collection methods. As 
described by Boyce and Neale (2006), the interview process consists of several steps. The 
first is to make a plan where you identify the stakeholders that will be involved, identify 
what information is needed and from whom, and make a list of stakeholders to be 
interviewed (Boyce & Neale, 2006).  
 
The next step is to develop an interview guide that lists the issues to be explored. 
According to Boyce and Neale (2006), there should be no more that 15 main questions to 
guide the interview, one should ask factual questions before opinion questions, and use 
probes when needed. The interview method can be quite time consuming, difficult to 
generalize, and is also prone to be biased as the respondents often want to show that their 
“way of doing things” is working (Boyce & Neale, 2006). It is therefore important that 
the interviewer makes the respondent feel comfortable with sharing details, and appear 
interested in what they are sharing. It is also important to use effective interview 
techniques, such as avoiding yes/no and leading questions, and keeping personal opinions 
in check (Boyce & Neale, 2006).  
 
When analysing the data, one should read through all the interview responses to look for 
patterns or themes among the participants (Boyce & Neale, 2006). If a variety of themes 
is found, one should according to Boyce and Neale (2006) try to arrange them into groups 
in a meaningful way, for example by company size, sector, gender of the participant and 
so on. When presenting the results of the interviews, direct quotes from the respondents 
will according to Boyce and Neale (2006) add credibility to the information. It is 
important to use qualitative descriptors rather than trying to “quantify” the information 
(Boyce & Neale, 2006). Numbers and percentages sometimes indicate that the results can 
be projected to a population, however this is not within the capabilities of this qualitative 
research procedure (Boyce & Neale, 2006). Data can still be displayed in tables, boxes, 
and figures to make it easier to read (Boyce & Neale, 2006). 
 
As mentioned, the interviews for this case study were carried out with people in 
managerial positions in each of the six participating companies. It was important that the 
interviewees had specific knowledge about the company’s establishment in Indonesia. 
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Due to geographical distance since many of the respondents were located in Indonesia or 
in other Asian countries such as the Philippines and Hong Kong, most of the interviews 
had to be conducted through phone calls, skype, and emails. However, there were still 
occasions when the interviews could be conducted in person. The interviews were semi-
structured, based on an interview guide that was created with regards to the six 
propositions, with the goal of acquiring optimal answers to the problem statement. This 
interview guide can be found in the appendix of the thesis. The results of the interviews 
will be presented in Chapter 5 based on the arguments of Boyce and Neale (2006), and 
then analysed and discussed in Chapter 6 based on the discussion by Yin (2014) and 
Myers (2013).  
 
4.2.3 Content Analysis 
According to Titscher, Meyer, Wodak and Vetter (2000, p. 55), content analysis is “the 
longest established method of text analysis among the set of empirical methods of social 
investigation.” The development of content analysis is also increasing in significance 
with the dramatic expansion of mass communication (Titscher et. al, 2000). According to 
Kolbe and Burnett (1991) content analysis can be used to systematically evaluate the 
content of all forms of recorded communications, and can assess the effects of 
environmental factors, such as economical, cultural and regulatory factors (Kolbe & 
Burnett, 1991). Additionally, content analysis forms a good empirical basis for further 
production of research evidence (Kolbe & Burnett, 1991). Based on this, content analysis 
has a good potential for being a companion research method alongside other methods, 
and the use of such a combination can according to Kolbe and Burnett (1991) contribute 
to enhancing the validity of the research, through comparisons of findings.   
 
The content analysis of this research consists of data collection for the different case 
study companies, of Indonesia as a market, the Indonesian rule of law regarding foreign 
investments, and of market opportunities for Norwegian business in Indonesia. The 
collected data consists of information released by the companies themselves through their 
organizational websites, and of reports produced by governmental entities and 
organizations such as the World Bank, The Norwegian Government, and Innovation 
Norway. Content analysis based on prior research on the relevant subjects has also been 
conducted, and comparisons between theoretical and empirical findings have been drawn 
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based on the results of the combination of content analysis and interviews, which will be 
presented in Chapter 6.  
 
4.3 Sampling and Data Collection  
4.3.1 Sampling  
According to Sekaran and Bougie (2013), sampling involves a procedure of selecting 
elements out of a chosen population, based on certain criteria. And when choosing 
interviewees, one should according to Boyce and Neale (2006) consider a sample that 
best represents the diverse stakeholders and opinions of those stakeholders. The general 
rule about interview sampling is according to Boyce and Neale (2006) that when the 
same stories, themes, issues, and topics are emerging from the different interviews, then a 
sufficient sample size has been reached.  
 
The sampling for this thesis was done by selecting a number of companies out of the 
population of Norwegian companies that were currently engaged in the Indonesian 
market. This information was provided by Innovation Norway in Indonesia. In order to 
explore the differences between company size, sector, resource commitment, and 
international experience, the companies were chosen based on variations of these factors, 
and belong within one the different sector-groupings: Oil & Gas, Aquaculture, Maritime, 
and Energy. The population of Norwegian companies operating in Indonesia at the 
moment is approximately 60 companies. Out of the companies that were contacted, six 
wished to participate in the case study, and after conducting the interviews and content 
searches for these companies, this was found to be a sufficient number to get a good 
overview of the situation and the relevant factors that have an impact on the decision 
making process when entering the Indonesian market.  
 
4.3.2 Operationalization 
Sarantakos (1993, p. 46) defined operationalization as “the process of converting 
concepts into their empirical measurements or of quantifying variables for the purpose of 
measuring their occurrence, strength and frequency”. To better be able to analyse the 
findings of the data collection with regards to the problem statement and the six 
propositions, the theoretical concepts used in the propositions were operationalized into 
more measurable factors:  
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Perceived need for management control (as compared to operating in Norway):  
Lower - Similar - Higher  
 
Perceived cultural distance:  
Low - Medium - High  
 
Perceived risk and uncertainty in Indonesia (as compared to operating in Norway): 
Lower - Same - Higher 
 
Perceived sector risk in Indonesia (as compared to other sectors): 
Lower - Same - Higher 
 
General International Experience (Outside of Norway): 
Low (1-5 years), Middle (6-11 years), High (12+ years) 
 
Culture Specific Experience (in Indonesia or similar cultures):  
Low (1-5 years), Middle (6-11 years), High (12+ years) 
 
Size:  
Small (below 100 employees), Medium (100-1000 employees), Large (1000+ employees) 
 
Level of Resource Commitment:  
Low (Product sales), Medium (Sales/Marketing/Services), High (All operations)  
 
Sectors:  
Maritime, Aquaculture, Oil & Gas, Energy 
 
4.3.3 Validity and Reliability 
According to Joppe (2000 p. 1, in Golafshani, 2003, p. 599), “Validity determines 
whether the research truly measures that which it was intended to measure or how 
truthful the research results are.” According to Golafshani (2003), some qualitative 
researchers have argued that the term validity is not applicable to qualitative research, but 
they have also realised the need for some kind of qualifying check or measure for their 
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research. According to Golafshani (2003, p. 603), “the quality of a research is related to 
generalizability of the result and thereby to the testing and increasing of the 
trustworthiness of the research.” Even though the ability to generalize findings is one of 
the most common tests of validity for quantitative research, Patton (2001, in Golafshani, 
2003) states that the generalizability in qualitative case studies, is however not as simple, 
and will depend on the cases selected and studied.  
 
Joppe (2000, p.1 in Golafshani, 2003 p. 598) defines reliability as “the extent to which 
results are consistent over time and an accurate representation of the total population is 
under study.” She additionally states, “If the results of a study can be reproduced under 
a similar methodology, then the research instrument is considered to be reliable.” 
According to Stenbacka (2001, p. 551), while reliability is used in quantitative studies to 
evaluate the quality of the study with a “purpose of explaining”, the quality concept in 
qualitative study has the purpose of “generating understanding”. This difference in 
purposes of evaluating the quality of studies in quantitative and quantitative research is 
according to Golafshani (2003, p. 601), “one of the reasons that the concept of reliability 
is irrelevant in qualitative research”. And according to Stenbacka, (2001) the concept of 
reliability can even be misleading in qualitative research. However, as stated by Patton 
(2001, in Golafshani, 2003) reliability can be viewed as a consequence of the validity in a 
study, with regards to the researcher's ability and skill. The way to achieve validity, and 
consequently reliability of a research, is according to Golafshani (2003), to eliminate bias 
and increase the researcher’s truthfulness.  
 
Based on the discussions of Joppe (2000), Golafshani (2003), Stenbacka (2001) and 
Patton (2001), it is clear that the testing of validity and reliability will not be as easy in a 
qualitative study as it would have been in a quantitative study. It may however, still be 
relevant to briefly consider some aspects of validity and reliability in the study. Looking 
at the reproduction of results, it will be hard to say whether the results of the interviews 
can be viewed as generalizable for the whole population that is Norwegian companies in 
Indonesia. Even though approximately 10% of the total population took part in the case 
study, it is not a given that the same results will be provided by a sample of different 
companies. Still, having chosen companies from different sectors and business types, a 
broader perspective can be given than if the study only contained companies within one 
sector or industry. The case study also contained content analysis of relevant documents, 
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reports and company websites. The use of such a combination can according to Kolbe 
and Burnett (1991) contribute to enhancing the validity of the research, through 
comparisons of findings.  
 
To increase the probability of getting in touch with the relevant people in the selected 
companies, the researcher’s former employer in Innovation Norway Indonesia provided 
as previously mentioned a “letter of introduction”. This letter of introduction may have 
contributed to a larger and more relevant response rate. Being collected through the use 
of interviews, there are also many factors that could have an impact on the acquired data, 
such as the interview settings, the respondents’ mood on the day of the interview, and 
perhaps most importantly; the interview skills and knowledge of the interviewer. The 
general notion of this case study was that all the interviews went well. The interviewer 
made sure that all the questions were clear, that the respondents understood the meaning 
of them, and how this related to the overall topic of the thesis. The respondents appeared 
to be relaxed and willing to answer all of the questions, and they were also very positive 
to the topic of the thesis.  
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5. Presentation of Data 
The six participating companies in the case study will now be presented. First an 
introduction of each company will be made, followed by the most relevant points from 
the interview(s) related to each company.   
 
5.1 Statoil 
Statoil is an international oil and gas company with operations in 37 countries. With more 
than 40 years of experience from oil and gas production on the Norwegian continental 
shelf, Statoil has been one of the most important players in the Norwegian oil industry 
(Statoil, 2016). Statoil is headquartered in Stavanger, Norway, with approximately 
22,000 employees worldwide, and is listed on the New York and Oslo stock exchanges 
(Statoil, 2016).  
 
Outside of Norway, the Angolan continental shelf is the largest contributor to Statoil's oil 
production, and is a key building block for Statoil's international production growth. 
Statoil has been in the country since 1991 and are partners in ten producing fields 
(Statoil, 2016). Statoil’s subsidiary Statoil Asia Pacific, which is headquartered in 
Singapore, is responsible for Statoil’s sales, marketing and other downstream activities in 
Asia (Statoil, 2016).  
 
Statoil opened a representative office in Indonesia in 2006 and has since then 
systematically built up an offshore exploration portfolio (Statoil, 2016). In recent years, 
their explorations for oil and gas in Indonesia have gradually moved towards the eastern 
part of the country (Statoil, 2016). Statoil now have ownership holdings in the deep-water 
blocks Kuma and Karama, with a 51% interest in the Karama PSC, and a 40% interest in 
the Kuma PSC (Statoil, 2016). Both fields are located off the coast, in water depths 
ranging from 1,000 to 2,000 metres (Statoil, 2016). 
 
5.1.1 Interview with the former Country Director of Statoil in Indonesia 
In an interview on 24.02.16 with Tor Fjæran, the former Country Director of Statoil in 
Indonesia, he talks about his experiences with establishing Statoil’s business operations 
in the country. On the reason for establishment there, Fjæran mentions sustainability and 
profitability as important factors. According to Fjæran, Indonesia have a long experience 
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with land drilling, dating back to the late 1800s but little offshore experience. Statoil has 
therefore remained offshore in Indonesia, since that is what they are best at. 
 
Establishment 
Statoil entered Indonesia in 2006 with the help of the American oil giant ConocoPhillips. 
“Indonesia is a complex country in terms of doing business, but we did it together with 
ConocoPhillips, who had several years of experience in Indonesia and a good knowledge 
of the market, and that was of great help to us. We applied for a license together with the 
state owned company Pertamina and got it through partnership with them. It was 
important for us to build a strong relationship with Pertamina, and we also had 
Norwegian backing in bilateral relations between Norway and Indonesia since both of 
our companies were state-owned.” 
 
They started out with an office in Jakarta with five Norwegians, and then recruited more 
local staff. According to Fjæran, it was not a simple "straightforward" establishment. 
“We tried to do it step by step, and to tread lightly to avoid making mistakes. We 
established ourselves in Indonesia after Statoil’s experiences with corruption in Iran, and 
that had made us extra aware of the challenge with corruption. It is very easy to be 
drawn into things if you are not prepared.” 
 
Since Statoil operates in several other countries, there are some slight variations between 
the establishment forms in the different countries, but all in all they are relatively similar, 
as Statoil always needs to apply for licenses. “In my experience it is easier to establish 
business in Indonesia than in, say, Russia or Nigeria, but it is more complicated than in 
for example the US or Canada.” 
 
Risk and Control 
On the management's need for control of operations in Indonesia, Fjæran stated, “It is 
important to at an early stage make a country analysis to try to understand how the 
country works, both politically and socially. You can enter alone, to ensure control, but 
for us it was nice to have someone to do it together with. To secure ourselves against the 
problems we could face, we still wanted a certain level of control. But things usually look 
worse than they really are, seen from the outside. Spending time to understand the 
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country and the community is the best way to establish control. The key lies within 
understanding rather than assuming.” 
 
On the amount of risk in the Oil and gas sector compared to other sectors, Fjæran brings 
up corruption as a main cause for risk. “I have previously worked a bit in the fisheries 
industry, and like with Oil and Gas, corruption has also been complex matter there. The 
way I see it, the greater value traded, the more opportunities there are for corruption. In 
this sense oil and gas may be more susceptible, but as long as it is a sector that requires 
permits and use of land, there will always be a high degree of risk. This would probably 
apply to the energy sector as well. Still, the advantage of the oil/gas and energy sectors is 
that they have a high priority in the country and with the government, which can in some 
cases make things easier.” 
 
Cultural Distance 
Fjæran lived in Indonesia for six years, together with his Norwegian family. On the 
matter of a cultural distance between Norway and Indonesia, Fjæran states that there is a 
significant distance. “I found that the longer you are in a place, and the more you think 
you know and understand, the more complicated you find out that things really are. 
Especially if you go out in the regional areas. You always learn something new.” 
 
The main issues in a business setting, was the lack of trust in the local politicians and the 
high level of corruption. “It's an insane bureaucracy, especially in the Oil and Gas 
industry. Corruption penetrates the Indonesian community, and one can not trust the 
system. We tried to avoid meetings and relations with politicians, but this was even more 
complicated in the regional areas. There we met politicians who also had important 
business roles. We often experienced pressure, but we just had to take the time it took, 
even if it cost us a lot more. 
 
Another challenge is according to Fjæran the lack of efficiency. “There are no incentives 
to do a good job, rather incentives to do as little a possible. There is also a very low 
focus on innovation and efficiency. For instance, the government has not previously 
invested a lot to develop Pertamina, which has become a problem now that they want to 
build a stronger oil and gas business in the country.” 
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Fjæran still has a positive outlook on Indonesia and how it has developed throughout the 
last few years, stating “I'm very impressed with how democracy has evolved over the 
years I've been there. Asia and Indonesia is far better at this than South America, Africa 
and the Middle east.” 
 
5.2 Wilhelmsen Ships Service 
Wilhelmsen Ships Service is a part of Wilhelmsen Maritime Services AS, which is a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding. Wilh. Wilhelmsen was 
established in 1861, and was by 1900 the largest fleet under the Norwegian flag (Wilh. 
Wilhelmsen, 2016). In 1911 they entered into liner trade, and increased their international 
presence by establishing “the Norwegian Africa and Australia Line” (Wilh. Wilhelmsen, 
2016).   
 
Wilhelmsen Ships Service is now a leading global provider of products and services to 
the offshore and maritime industry (Wilhelmsen Ships Service, 2016). This includes 
safety products and services, Unitor marine products, Unitor and Nalfleet marine 
chemicals, maritime logistics and ships agency (Wilhelmsen Ships Service, 2016). 
Wilhelmsen Ships Service is divided into four main regions; Europe, Asia Pacific, 
Americas and Africa, Middle East and the Black Sea, with regional headquarters in 
Lysaker, Singapore, Houston and Dubai. They have 4,500 specialised marine employees 
in 75 offices worldwide, and service 2,200 ports in 125 countries, making it the world’s 
largest maritime network (Wilhelmsen Ships Service, 2016). Last year they made product 
deliveries to 25,000 vessels and handled 70,000 port calls (Wilhelmsen Ships Service, 
2016).  
 
Wilhelmsen Ships Service has been active in Indonesia for 26 years, 25 of which were 
together with its former partner PT Tirta Samudera Caraka (Eikum, 2015). Wilhelmsen 
Ships Service split from its partner on March 1st 2015, and now has a small 
representative office in Jakarta.    
 
5.2.1 Interview with the General Manager of WSS Indonesia 
In an interview on 03.02.16 with Lennart Stockmann, the General Manager of 
Wilhelmsen Ships Service in Indonesia, he mentions high levels of corruption, briberies 
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and facilitations as major challenges for the company’s operations in Indonesia. 
Corruption was according to Stockmann one of the main reasons for the split between 
Wilhelmsen Ships Service and their former partner PT Tirta Samudera Caraka.  
 
Establishment 
Wilhelmsen Ships Service now has a representative office in Indonesia, but their goal is 
according to Stockmann to find a new local partner. The company has establishments in 
other countries as well, but does not use the same entry mode in all the different markets. 
“It varies from country to country. Some countries require by law that you must have a 
partner to establish a sustainable and long term partnership, while other countries, allow 
you as a foreign company to do the establishment without any domestic 
partners/companies are involved” (Stockmann, 2016).   Stockmann also stated that, “if 
we as a global company could be granted more free hands without applying for all kind 
of various documentations, it would be better and more attractive for any serious 
companies to set and prepare for a more sustainable future.” 
 
Risk and Control 
Stockmann believes that there is a much higher need for management control in 
Indonesia than in Norway. He also thinks that the maritime sector has a higher level of 
risk than other sectors. “For me it is very clear that 99% of the Indonesian people, 
employees and companies are trying to work around the law, especially the tax law. 
Corruption, bribery and facilitations are common every day in every sectors, but 
especially within the maritime sector”. 
 
Cultural Distance 
Stockmann has lived in Indonesia for 14 years, and according to him, there is a high 
cultural distance between Indonesia and Norway. His experience with the Indonesian 
business culture is that it is not always easy, and “you can never take a no for a no”. He 
also states “You don’t find too many honest, reliable, trustworthy and transparent 
business agreements. There is always a way for the Indonesians to get clear of any 
contract agreement. I simply don’t trust an Indonesian agreement and there again, many 
Indonesian companies can’t accept an agreement made outside Indonesia.”    
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On successfully doing business in Indonesia, Stockmann stated that “First you must 
understand how Indonesia works, and then you must accept how it works. Always try to 
contact someone, expats or foreign company representatives, who have been in Indonesia 
for some years to learn more about what you should and should not do.” 
 
 
5.3 SN Power 
SN Power’s history dates back to 2002, when the two Norwegian state entities Statkraft 
and Norfund joined forces as a 50-50 joint venture to establish a hydropower company 
that focused on emerging markets (SN Power, 2015). SN Power and its subsidiaries now 
have over 500 employees worldwide in 13 countries, and have reported US$2.6 billion in 
total assets and US$1.9 billion in equity on a consolidated basis (Norfund, 2016). During 
the company’s first four years in operation, SN Power in quick succession entered the 
markets of Sri Lanka (2003), Peru (2003), India (2004), Chile (2005), the Philippines 
(2005), and Nepal (2006). In 2006 SN Power and their Philippine partner Aboitiz 
launched SN Aboitiz Power (SNAP), where SN Power holds 50%. SNAP then acquired 
Magat, the largest hydropower plant in the Philippines (SN Power, 2015). 
 
In June 2013, Statkraft and Norfund agreed to restructure and prolong their cooperation 
within renewable energy until 2023, but now with an increased geographical focus on 
Southeast Asia, Africa and Central America (SN Power, 2015). In Indonesia, SN Power 
officially signed an agreement in September 2015 for the development of a 127MW 
hydropower project in the river Lariang in West Sulawesi (Eikum, 2015). If everything 
goes according to plan, the project will be completed in 2020.  
 
5.3.1 Interview with Country Director of SN Power Philippines 
In an interview on 17.02.16 with the country director of SN Power in the Philippines, Tor 
Stokke, he elaborated on their new project in the river Lariang in West Sulawesi, 
Indonesia.  SN Power’s entry mode in Indonesia is a partnership with the Indonesian 





According to Stokke, there is a minimum requirement of a 50% local partnership, due to 
regulations in the Indonesian energy industry. “PT Energi Infranusantara will contribute 
with both knowledge and capital. We have considered various partners but ended up on 
this one, which we hope will be a good partner for us.” 
 
SN Power is now using consultants in Indonesia, and has a close relationship with the 
Norwegian Embassy there, since they are still quite early in the development process. 
According to Stokke, “the full development takes several years from start to finish, with 
different stages of engineering and location scouting. The project will cost between 4-600 
million dollars, so there is a large investment going into this. Things therefore need to be 
very carefully planned and executed.” If this project turns out to be successful, other 
projects in Indonesia will be set in motion, and SN Power is according to Stokke 
considering opening a representative office in Indonesia, as they have done in several 
other countries. Normally, SN Power uses a combination of their own employees, and 
locals.  
 
The main reason for entering Indonesia was according to Stokke “the good climate 
conditions with a lot of rain, which is of course important for hydropower. There is also 
a large demand for more energy in Indonesia, and due to relatively low costs related to 
constructing the facilities and running it, the establishment will hopefully give a high 
yield.”  
 
SN power has establishments in several other countries, and Stokke explained that SN 
Power uses partners in most places, as it is often a requirement to obtain licenses. 
However, in some places like for example Peru, SN Power has never had a partner, and 
that has according to Stokke also worked well. 
 
Risk and Control 
On the need for management control in Indonesia as compared to in Norway, Stokke 
stated that “things work in different ways, business in Norway is more based on trust. The 
need for control in Indonesia is higher than in Norway, especially when it comes to 
decision making.  However, in my opinion the need for control is even higher in the 
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Philippines than in Indonesia.” Having had operations in the Philippines since 2005 is 
therefore according to Stokke an advantage for SN Power.  
 
On the level of risk in Indonesia, Stokke mentions corruption, permits, and licenses as the 
main challenges and causes of risk. SN Power has a zero tolerance for corruption, which 
makes business deals challenging and prolonged. And the level of risk in the energy 
industry compared to other industries is according to Stokke higher. “When doing a 
project like this, there are a lot of people involved, we may have to dam up certain areas, 
and there are a lot of things that can go wrong. Especially since we are always trying to 
have the lowest environmental and social impact possible.” 
 
Stokke mentioned that it is important for SN Power to identify their main risks early on, 
and then find out how to deal with them accordingly. “There are different types of risk, 
and we have people working on what can be done with the various causes of risk, and 
how to deal with them. Some things are however more difficult to deal with, such as 
natural disasters, earthquakes and so forth.” 
 
Cultural Distance 
Stokke is currently living in Manila, Philippines. According to him, the Indonesian way 
of doing business is relatively similar to that of the Philippines. There, as in Indonesia, it 
has been very important to work together with local stakeholders.  
 
On how cultural differences affect choices in the implementation of projects in Indonesia, 
Stokke stated, “It can be challenging, as there are many cultural differences. Not only 
between Norway and Indonesia, but you also have to adapt to many local cultures within 
Indonesia. People in for instance Jakarta can be very different from people in Sulawesi. 
Therefore, it is important to use local people, especially in the start-up phase.” 
 
5.4 Gexcon 
Gexcon AS is a world-leading company in the field of safety and risk management, 
advanced dispersion, explosion and fire modelling (Gexcon, 2016). Headquartered in 
Bergen, Norway, Gexcon now consists of 40 engineers. The first overseas offices were 
established in 2008, and by 2012 Gexcon had employees in 5 offices around the world: in 
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Washington DC (USA), Houston (USA), Perth (Australia), Ormskirk (UK), Jakarta 
(Indonesia), Dubai (UAE), Shanghai (China) and Pune (India). Their “FLACS CFD” 
software is now used in more than 150 organizations worldwide (Gexcon, 2016). 
 
The competence of the company is built on 35 years of focused research and consultancy 
in the parent company Christian Michelsen Research (Gexcon, 2016). Gexcon was 
established as a brand name in 1987, but the gas explosion consultancy services were 
only formally separated from Christian Michelsen Research until 2000, when Gexcon 
took over all explosion safety activities (Gexcon, 2016). 
 
5.2.1 Interview with the CEO of Gexcon 
In an interview on 10.03.16 with Sturle Harald Pedersen, the CEO of Gexcon, he 
mentions finding and training experienced staff as the main challenge for the company 
when operating in Indonesia. He also explains several years of experience with 




PT Gexcon Indonesia was established in February 2012, and now employs eight 
Indonesians. The Indonesian subsidiary delivers risk analysis, modelling of explosions 
and calamity ratings commissioned from all over the world through the Gexcon group.  
 
According to Pedersen, Malaysia was also considered, but after a cost-benefit assessment, 
they ended up with Indonesia because they saw a greater activity there in the future. 
“Indonesia as a market is on the rise, and it is expected to become one of the world's 10 
largest economies over the next 15 years. It is important for us to position ourselves in 
new growth markets”. This rapid development will, according to Pedersen, result in 
significant changes in the oil, gas and energy industry.  
 
The implementation process was very quick, only about 3-6 months from the time they 
decided to enter Indonesia. According to Pedersen, the choice of a subsidiary as the entry 
mode was easy. “For us, it was out of the question to partner with an Indonesian 
company. I have many years of experience with start-up companies in Asia, and I 
generally have a bad experience with partnerships. They can all too easily become a 
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silent partner who just sits there and receives the cash, without actually contributing 
something. Initially, we were told to find a local partner, but luckily things worked out so 
that we did not have to.”  
 
Gexcon appointed local staff right away, and sent them on an intense training program in 
Norway for a few months. As according to Pedersen, “in a consulting business, the most 
important thing is to have competent employees.” Gexcon has also used the same mode 
of entry for operations in the other 4 countries they are currently operating in, and “all 
the different subsidiaries have their own responsibilities with regards to financial factors, 
both regarding losses and liabilities.” 
 
Risk and Control 
On the issue of risk and control, Pedersen stated that the management’s need for control 
is very high in Indonesia. Pedersen also perceived the risk of operating in Indonesia as 
higher than that of Norway, but he did not perceive the risk of operating in their sector as 
very different from other sectors.  
 
According to Pedersen, different legislative, cultural, and political factors contribute to an 
increased level of risk for them. The perhaps greatest risk is related to the fact that they 
mainly do consulting. “Consulting is built on expertise and a strong reputation, and it is 
therefore important that the quality is perceived as good. Control is incredibly important, 
to ensure that the quality is the same in all the countries where we operate. We also sell 
software, and then it's a bit different, since we are not as vulnerable then as we are with 
the consultations.” 
 
According to Pedersen, it is important to ensure control, but also to have confidence in 
their employees. “It is important to prevent distrust, while still ensuring that there is 
some control. Trust is based on both parties knowing and understanding the procedures 
and following them, and also having confidence in that everyone works toward a common 
goal and have common interests. The most important thing is therefore that the 
organization has good control routines”. 
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According to Pedersen, challenges with corruption are present, but states that “we may be 
a bit naive, but we think we've managed to develop a system of control and procedures 
that to a large degree helps prevent corruption in our organisation”. 
 
Cultural Distance 
Pedersen himself has never lived full-time in Indonesia, but he has 30 years of experience 
with doing business in Asian countries. He describes his experience with Indonesian 
business culture as “moderate”, but still states that, “there is a high cultural distance 
between Norway and Indonesia, and this has a large impact on Gexcon’s business 
operations in Indonesia.”  
 
One of the main challenges with the establishment in Indonesia was that the Indonesian 
education system is a bit different than in Norway. “I would say that they have a pretty 
good education, but there is still a difference between a Norwegian engineer and an 
Indonesian engineer”. Additionally, the definition of a leader is according to Pedersen 
“fundamentally different in the various countries where we operate”. This leads to a 
higher need for both control and trust.  
 
5.5 AquaOptima 
AquaOptima was founded in 1993, based on comprehensive R&D activity in SINTEF 1 
in the period of 1985-1993 (AquaOptima, 2016). AquaOptima specializes in recirculation 
aquaculture systems (RAS), and offer hatcheries and grow-out land-based farms to the 
world market for a variety of species, based on their own technology (AquaOptima, 
2016).  
 
The RAS system is based on patented products and removal of solids directly from fish 
tanks that ensures better water quality inside tank and better suitability for treatment of 
water in prior to recirculation  (AquaOptima, 2016). AquaOptima has delivered RAS for 
warm and cold-water species and for fresh and sea water all over the world since 1993. 
As of now the company has experience in species like Atlantic salmon, Arctic char, 
Atlantic cod, Halibut, Rainbow trout, Tilapia, Sea bass, Sea bream, Barramundi, Japanese 
flounder, Turbot, Eel, Tiger puffer fish and Sturgeon (AquaOptima, 2016).  
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AquaOptima works as an independent company in terms of supply, and often chooses a 
combination of equipment from Norway, Europe, USA, South East Asia, and local 
suppliers from the country they operate in (AquaOptima, 2016). They also supervise 
during installation and perform the commissioning and assistance during the first period 
of a new operation. AquaOptima have been operating internationally since a project in 
Japan in 2002 (AquaOptima, 2016).  
 
Their Indonesian project in the Regency of Yapen started in 2014, and is now under 
construction. The Yapen project is a hatchery for Barramundi that can produce 1 million 
of 20 grams fingerlings per year, sea cages for grow-out of Barramundi, as well as sea 
cages for fattening of Tuna (AquaOptima, 2016).    
 
5.5.1 Interview with the COO of AquaOptima 
In an interview on 08.03.16 with Børge Søraas, the Chief Operating Officer of 
AquaOptima, he mentions preservation of biological factors as one of the main causes of 
risks for the company when operating in Indonesia. AquaOptima has worked on their 
current project in Indonesia since 2014, but Søraas himself has been involved in the 
country since 2012, first with state projects between Norway and Indonesia, and then 
later in AquaOptima. 
 
Establishment 
The reason why they decided to enter Indonesia was due to a request from the local 
Regency of Yapen in Papua. “We have also studied the Indonesian market, and we see 
that there is a potential here”. AquaOptima is now looking for new projects in Indonesia, 
and if they get into a few more contracts, they are according to Søraas considering 
establishing a local office in Jakarta. 
 
Risk and Control 
The risk for AquaOptima is mainly related to biological factors. AquaOptima is operating 
in other countries as well, but Indonesia is according to Søraas a bit different from the 
others. “As Indonesia is an underdeveloped aquaculture country, industrially speaking, 
we see that there must be an introductory sale at an earlier stage than in some other 
countries where aquaculture is more established. In other countries, it is often the 
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farmers who come directly to us with a clear idea of what they want to do, while in 
Indonesia we usually give suggestions on the whole business case.” 
 
According to Søraas, it is important for AquaOptima to hold a high level of control when 
doing business in Indonesia. “Due to differences in business culture, it is important to 
have a high level control. Since we are not permanently present, we choose to work with 
an Indonesian company to increase this control. We spend time on quality control of 
communication, conducting thorough customer visits and so on.” 
 
Cultural Distance 
Søraas describes the cultural distance as “medium-high”, stating that, “openness in 
communication is a challenge, as well as agreements on time. There is also more 
uncertainty in the implementation of various tasks.” On how cultural differences affects 
AquaOptima’s choices upon completion of the projects in Indonesia, Søraas stated “It 
takes more time with clients and partners. There is a need for the business relationship to 
almost turn into a personal relationship and hence it is more time-consuming to build up 
such relationships. But then again, it is also very enjoyable.” 
 
5.5.2 Researcher Observations 
As an intern in Innovation Norway in Indonesia, the researcher also helped organize  - 
and attended a seminar on Sustainable Aquaculture on 24.11.15 in Jakarta, where 
AquaOptima was one of the participating companies. The focus of the seminar was 
sustainable aquaculture, and Børge Søraas held a presentation about AquaOptima’s 
aquafarming technologies, and about their project in the Regency of Yapen. 
Representatives from the Regency of Yapen were also present. The researcher’s 
observation was that AquaOptima possesses ground-breaking capabilities and 
technologies that are highly sought after in Indonesia. Their relationship with the local 
stakeholders in Yapen also seemed to be very good. 
 
5.6 Ocean Supreme 
Ocean Supreme AS is a Norwegian seafood company specialized in serving customers in 
Asia with fresh airborne “Sashimi-Quality” salmon 52 weeks/year (Ocean Supreme, 
2016). The company was established in Ålesund, Norway in July 2003 in cooperation 
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with Alsaker Fjordbruk AS which is a leading salmon farming company with an annual 
production of 35.000 metric tons Atlantic Salmon (Ocean Supreme, 2016). The founders 
and employees of Ocean Supreme AS have long experience in integrating farming, 
processing and logistics for stable weekly deliveries of fresh high-quality salmon (Ocean 
Supreme, 2016). 
  
The main market for Ocean Supreme is Japan, where they have sold fresh salmon every 
week throughout the year for over a decade (Ocean Supreme, 2016). The company’s 
focus on optimized logistic solutions for shipping of salmon have resulted in an annual 
turnover of more than 100 million USD, and it is now one of the leading export 
companies in Norway for airborne salmon to Asia (Ocean Supreme, 2016). 
 
5.6.1 Interview with the Managing Director and the Sales Director of Ocean 
Supreme 
In an interview on 30.03.16 with the company’s Managing Director, Botolf Stolt-Nielsen 
and the Sales Director Odd Frode Roaldsnes, they both mention Indonesian import quotas 
as the greatest challenge for Ocean Supreme when exporting salmon to Indonesia. 
According to Stolt-Nielsen, Ocean Supreme now has 14 employees and had a turnover of 
823 million NOK last year. 
 
Establishment 
Ocean Supreme chose to enter the Indonesian market in 2010, after having had a steady 
growth since their start-up in 2003. According to Stolt-Nielsen, “We saw that we had 
increased capacity. We also saw a growing market in Indonesia, and a growing demand 
for salmon each year.” According to Stolt-Nielsen, Ocean Supreme entered Indonesia 
largely on their own. “We did a lot of research beforehand, to find potential distributors. 
We travelled there, met with potential importers and studied market statistics.”  
 
Ocean Supreme’s only office is located in Ålesund, Norway, but according to Stolt-
Nielsen, they export to most of the airborne markets in the world. They have not 
considered opening an office in Indonesia, as they feel things work well as they are 
today. According to Roaldsnes, “We buy the salmon directly from local fish farmers here 
in Norway, which we then re-sell to a variety of importers in Indonesia. They take over 
all the responsibility for the fish after it has landed at the airport in Jakarta. The 
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importers are often restaurant chains, and they are chosen very carefully. Over the years 
we have been working in Indonesia now, we have found out who we want to work with, 
and who we don’t.” 
 
Risk and Control 
Stolt-Nielsen and Roaldsnes both agree that the issue with Indonesian import quotas is 
the greatest source of risk for Ocean Supreme in Indonesia. The problem lies with the fact 
that it is the importers that get the quotas, not the exporters. The quotas also fluctuate, so 
they never know quite how large the quotas really are, which creates a high level of 
uncertainty for the company. According to Stolt-Nielsen, “The challenge in Indonesia is 
therefore related to the building of sales channels, with the constant uncertainty of 
Indonesian import quotas. It is difficult both for our customers and for us to plan ahead 
of time as long as one does not know how the quota situation will be in the future.”  
 
According to Stolt-Nielsen, the quota problem makes it unfavourable for the market and 
inhibits growth. He mentions that they have had a similar experience in China, although 
in that case it has become even more difficult due to political reasons. Their biggest 
market, Japan is another case entirely. “If we compare Indonesia with Japan, it's like 
night and day. In Japan there is a free trade agreement, which is a big deal. Yet, we see 
that the growth in Japan has stagnated along with a low population growth compared 
with other Asian countries. We are therefore looking at markets in growth, such as 
Indonesia.” 
 
On the matter of risk and corruption, Roaldsnes stated “unlike other industries, we have 
no problems with corruption, since we have no physical operations in Indonesia, and we 
give away the responsibility of the fish when it lands at the airport. This is a great 
advantage for us. However, we still have a higher level of risk in terms of import quotas 
than many other industries.” 
 
On the matter of control, they both agree that there must be some form of control, but that 
it is important to also have a certain level of trust.  They also mention the importance of 
being careful when deciding whom to work with. According to Roaldsnes, “It is 
important for us that the salmon is treated properly. That the importers have good 
cooling facilities, strict requirements for the processing of salmon and that they are 
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professionals. So far we have not experienced any problems with this.” According to 
Stolt-Nielsen, they also have a credits insurance, to mitigate the financial risk, and “the 
importing companies that we work with are mainly large, professional companies, so 
there have been no problems with the financial settlements so far.”  
 
Cultural Distance 
Both Roaldsnes and Stolt-Nielsen agree that the experience of doing business in 
Indonesia so far has been good. “We have been on several customer visits to find out 
more about who we are working with, and we believe that the key is to always be open 
and humble towards the other culture.” According to Stolt-Nielsen, this applies to all the 
countries they work with, and he believes that this humbleness may fall easier for 
Norwegians, coming from such a small country. 
 
Roaldsnes and Stolt-Nielsen both agree that the challenge with cultural distance has been 
minimal. According to Stolt-Nielsen, “The people we are in contact with often have long 
experience in the industry, and use English as a working language. This has obviously 
made things easier. In addition, many of them have studied abroad in countries such as 




6. Analysis and Discussion  
6.1 Analysis of Findings 
To get a clearer overview of the collected data, and to more effectively analyse the 
different aspects of the cases, the main findings from will now be presented with regards 




Size:     22 000 employees in 37 countries 
Sector:    Oil/Gas 
Resource Commitment:  High (Exploration and drilling) 
International experience: General: 25 years, Culture Specific: 10 years (Indonesia) 
Establishment in Indonesia: Representative Office  
Partnership during Establishment: Partnership with PT Pertamina 
Perceived Need for Control: Higher than in Norway  
Perceived Country Risk: High (Main issues: corruption) 
Perceived Sector Risk: High (Due to the level of resource commitment) 




2. Wilhelmsen Ships Service 
Size:      4,500 employees in 75 offices worldwide 
Sector:    Maritime 
Resource Commitment:  Medium (Services)  
International experience:  General: 105 years, Culture Specific: 25 years (Indonesia) 
Establishment in Indonesia: Representative Office (Looking for a new partner) 
Partnership during Establishment: PT Tirta Samudera Caraka (Split in 2015) 
Perceived Need for Control: Higher than in Norway 
Perceived Country Risk: High (Main issues: corruption, bribery and facilitations) 
Perceived Sector Risk: Higher than other sectors 
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Perceived Cultural Distance: High (Main issues: dealing with authorities, lack of trust) 
 
 
3. SN Power                                                                           
Size:     500 employees in 13 countries 
Sector:    Energy 
Resource Commitment:  High (Construction of hydropower facilities) 
International experience:  General: 13 years, Culture Specific: 11 years (Philippines) 
Establishment in Indonesia: Partnership with PT Energi Infranusantara (Indonesia) and 
Aboitiz (Philippines) 
Perceived Need for Control: Higher than in Norway, lower than in the Philippines 
Perceived Country Risk: High (Main issues: corruption, getting licenses) 
Perceived Sector Risk: Same as other sectors (High environmental and social 
focus) 




4. Gexcon  
Size:     40 employees in 5 countries 
Sector:    Oil/Gas 
Resource Commitment:  Medium-high (Consulting services/Sales) 
International experience:  General: 8 years, Culture Specific: 4 years (Indonesia) 
Establishment in Indonesia: Subsidiary 
Partnerships during Establishment: None – Was never an option 
Perceived Need for Control: Higher than in Norway 
Perceived Country Risk: Higher than in Norway 
Perceived Sector Risk: Same as other sectors  






Size:     3 employees, 1 office (Trondheim, Norway) 
Sector:    Aquaculture 
Resource Commitment:  Medium-Low (Aquafarming projects) 
International experience:   General: 14 years, Culture Specific: 2 years (Indonesia) 
Establishment in Indonesia: Licensing (Sales of technology and equipment)  
Partnerships during Establishment: Contract with different partners through projects 
Perceived Need for Control: Higher than in Norway 
Perceived Country Risk: High (Biological risk) 
Perceived Sector Risk: Same as other sectors 
Perceived Cultural Distance: Medium-high 
 
 
6. Ocean Supreme 
Size:     14 employees, 1 office (Ålesund, Norway) 
Sector:    Aquaculture 
Resource Commitment:  Low (Exports of Salmon) 
International experience:   General:  13 years, Culture Specific:  6 years (Indonesia) 
Establishment in Indonesia: Exports (Norwegian Salmon) 
Partnerships during Establishment: Partnerships with Indonesian Distributors (Importers) 
Perceived Need for Control: Somewhat High 
Perceived Country Risk: High (Due to import quota issues) 
Perceived Sector Risk: High 




6.2 Discussion of Findings 
Looking at the factors presented in the analysis of findings, the general opinion among 
the respondents seems to indicate a high perceived need for management control, a high 
level of perceived risk related to operations in Indonesia, and a relatively high perceived 
cultural distance. The majority of the respondents also favoured local partnerships, either 
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through close cooperation with a local company, or by the use of local agents and 
distributors.  
 
In order to get a deeper understanding of the relationships between the different factors 
that may have an impact on the choice of entry mode, the findings will now be discussed 
with respect to each of the six propositions. The findings will then also be compared to 
previous empirical findings, in order to determine which factors that can actually be 
considered empirically grounded or if more research will be necessary.  
 
6.2.1 Proposition 1  
A high perceived need for management control indicates the choice of a subsidiary. 
 
The prominent opinion among all the respondents was that the company management felt 
the need to have a higher level of control over operations in Indonesia, especially 
compared to operations back in Norway.  
 
 
Figure 9: Entry Mode and Perceived Need for Control 
 
Many of the companies described a lack of trust between local and foreign employees as 
the main reason for this need for control. The Indonesian business culture also seemed to 
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play a part, since it according to some of the respondents, “lacks incentives for doing a 
good job”, which have created a “do as little as possible-attitude”.  
 
The respondent from Gexcon expressed a high need for control in operations, something 
that matches previous empirical findings with the choice of a wholly owned subsidiary. 
Being in partnerships with other local companies was never an option for Gexcon, 
something that also indicates a higher need for control through a sole ownership. Statoil 
and Wilhelmsen Ships Service, with their representative offices, also stated high needs 
for management control, although somewhat lower than Gexcon. SN Power expressed 
that the need for control in Indonesia was “higher than in Norway, but lower than in the 
Philippines”. The fact that the respondent has experience from a seemingly more 
challenging foreign market, still within the southeast Asian region, may be an advantage 
that has contributed to decreasing the perceived level of risk for SN Power in Indonesia, 
and consequently the need for high levels of control.  
 
AquaOptima and Ocean Supreme also expressed certain needs for control, but they did 
not put as great emphasis on it as the other companies in the case study. They also 
expressed lower levels of perceived risk with operating in Indonesia. The fact that both 
companies are using contractual modes, with low levels of resource commitments and 
relatively limited presences in Indonesia, may be the reasons for this.  
 
As discussed, many of the studied companies that displayed a high need for management 
control over operations in Indonesia, did indeed have high control modes such as 
representative offices and wholly owned subsidiaries. And the companies that expressed 
lower needs for control used contractual modes like licensing and exporting. The findings 
of Hill, Kim & Hwang (1990), and Brouthers & Hennart (2007), that a high need for 
control indicates the choice of a wholly owned entry mode, and that a low level of control 
indicates the choice of exporting or licensing, can therefore be viewed as similar to the 
empirical findings of this case study.  
 
Another explanatory factor may be found within the Indonesian rule of law. As presented 
in chapter 2.2.2, a foreign company entering Indonesia with a direct establishment needs 
to create either a foreign liability company (PT PMA) or a representative office. Looking 
at the companies in this case study, we know that Gexcon has an Indonesian subsidiary - 
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or limited liability foreign investment company, called PT Gexcon. Two of the 
companies in the case study, Wilhelmsen Ships Service and Statoil both have 
representative offices. As previously mentioned, there are some important restrictions on 
what representative offices for foreign companies can engage in. Not to mention the fact 
that the representative office is only valid for a maximum period of 5 years without a 
local partner. Statoil has a representative office, but they are also in a partnership with the 
Indonesian state owned company PT Pertamina. As Wilhelmsen Ships Service recently 
parted with their long time Indonesian partner, this can of course lead to some challenges 
for them. However, as the respondent mentioned in the interview, they were currently 
looking for a new Indonesian partner.  
 
The choice of a high-control entry mode can therefore be related both to the perceived 
need for management control over operations in Indonesia, as well as being a response to 
the Indonesian rule of law. The findings were also found to be similar to previous 
empirical findings, and the proposition therefore appears to be empirically grounded.  
 
6.2.2 Proposition 2  
The choice of a direct entry mode leads to a high level of perceived cultural distance 
and risk for the company.  
 
The prevalent perception among the respondents in the case study was high levels of both 
perceived cultural distance and perceived risk. There was a consistent opinion that 
particularly corruption, but also issues with the rule of law and import quotas, were the 
causes of this perceived risk and uncertainty, and that difficulties in communication and 
lack of trust were the causes of the perceived cultural distance.  
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Figure 10: The Choice of Entry Mode and Perceived Cultural Distance and Risk. 
 
The respondent from Wilhelmsen Ships Service expressed significant levels of both 
perceived cultural distance and perceived risk. The respondent mentioned a lack of 
trustworthiness and transparency as challenges regarding the high levels of perceived 
cultural distance. Corruption, facilitation and briberies were the main causes of risk for 
the company, as well as Indonesian legislation and rule of law. The respondent also 
believed that the maritime sector was more burdened by the level of corruption than other 
sectors.    
 
The respondent from Statoil also expressed high levels of both cultural distance and risk. 
The respondent stated that the longer he had lived and worked in Indonesia, the higher 
the cultural distance seemed to become. Permissions, licenses, and corruption were at the 
core of the perceived risk. The respondent from SN Power expressed only a medium high 
cultural distance, specifically regarding interaction with different local cultures. The 
respondent had several years of experience with working in the Philippines, and 
expressed a higher cultural distance when doing business there, than in Indonesia. 
However, the respondent expressed a very high level of risk related to the construction of 
the hydropower plant in Sulawesi, especially regarding the financial risk of the project. 
Indonesian legislation with different licenses and permits, as well as a high level of 
corruption were also important factors contributing to the perceived level of risk. SN 
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Power also put great emphasis on sustainability and operating in a responsible and 
sustainable way both with regards to the natural environment and to the local 
communities.  
 
The respondent from AquaOptima expressed a medium high cultural distance, where 
openness in communication, agreements on time, and uncertainty regarding operational 
implementation were the main challenges. The fact that AquaOptima is not permanently 
present in Indonesia may be a reason for this lower level of perceived distance. Still, the 
company does engage in business with local cultures that may be even “less western” 
than other parts of the country, when operating on rural islands such as Yapen. 
AquaOptima’s perception of risk was according to the respondent mainly due to the fact 
that Indonesia is relatively underdeveloped in the field of aqua farming. The respondent 
stated that in other countries it was normally the farmers who came to them with a clear 
idea of what to do, while in Indonesia AquaOptima had to provide suggestions on the 
whole business case. The respondent also mentioned biological factors as a cause of risk.  
 
The respondents from Ocean Supreme expressed low levels of cultural distance, and 
relatively low levels of risk. As they are only exporting goods to Indonesia, their response 
seems logical, since their actual interaction within Indonesia is quite low. The only 
people they are in contact with are their own distributors, whom they have carefully 
picked out. Corruption is therefore not a direct problem for them, as they pass on the 
responsibility of the fish once it lands at the airport in Jakarta, where most of the 
opportunities for corruption arises. The greatest risk for the company was according to 
the respondents related to issues with the Indonesian import quotas. These quotas are 
given from the Indonesian government to the different companies that act as distributors 
for the foreign goods. These quotas fluctuate, and Ocean Supreme does therefore not 
know how large the actual quotas are at present, and how large they will be in the future. 
Planning ahead is therefore a challenge for Ocean Supreme.      
 
The findings discussed above seems to be similar to the findings of Hill, Kim & Hwang 
(1990), Randøy & Dibrell (2002), and Brouthers & Hennart (2007), that the risk increases 
for direct entry modes and decreases for contractual modes. Evidently, the companies in 
this case study with direct entry modes were also the ones that expressed the highest 
levels of perceived risk and perceived cultural distance, while the contractual companies 
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expressed the lowest levels of perceived cultural distance and risk. The proposition can 
therefore be considered empirically grounded, as the findings of the case study is similar 
to that of the previous empirical findings. 
 
6.2.3 Proposition 3  
A high level of perceived risk and uncertainty indicates the choice of a local partner in 
the establishment stage. 
 
The perhaps most recurrent finding in this research was the call for having a local partner. 
As all the companies expressed a relatively high perception of risk with operating in 
Indonesia, and most of them also favoured having a close relationship with an Indonesian 
company, especially during the establishment phase.  
 
 
Figure 11: Perceived Risk and Partnerships during the Establishment Phase. 
 
As argued by López-Duarte and Vidal-Suárez (2013), the potential role that a local 
partner plays in reducing external uncertainty may critically depend on the relationship 
with the foreign investor. Therefore, when there for example are differences in language, 
foreign investors may prefer to invest through wholly owned subsidiaries rather than 
collaborating with a local company. As we can see from the figure above, most of the 
companies in this case study preferred local partnerships in one way or the other, despite 
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a language difference. The reason for this may lie in the fact that the majority of 
Indonesians that the Norwegian companies interact with, have a higher level of 
education, and therefore speak English very well. This was also pointed out by several of 
the respondents. Manufacturing firms and companies that operate on a lower operational 
level, and “out in the field”, would doubtless experience the language barrier to a much 
larger extent.  
 
As can be seen from the figure above, Gexcon was the only company that had no 
Indonesian partnerships, and also no interest in having one, despite expressing a high 
perception of risk and uncertainty. AquaOptima and Ocean Supreme did not have one 
specific partner, but were in close cooperation with different Indonesian companies, 
distributors and customers. They did also have a lower perception of risk than the other 
companies. Wilhelmsen Ships Service had a 25 years long partnership with PT Tirta 
Samudera Caraka before their split, Statoil has been in a partnership with Pertamina since 
their entry in 2006, and SN Power recently entered a partnership with PT Energi 
Infranusantara together with their Philippine partner Aboitiz. They all had quite a high 
perception of risk related to operating in the Indonesian market. According to the 
respondent from Statoil, Indonesia was a complicated country to do business in, but the 
fact that they were in partnership with the local company Pertamina from the beginning, 
mitigated some of the effects of this risk. These findings are similar to that of Barkema, 
Bell and Pennings (1996) who argued that a native partner - be it through joint ventures 
or by the use of agents is often required during the early stages of the market entry. 
 
There is also a legislative factor to be considered regarding partnerships. As previously 
mentioned, some sectors are wholly, or partially closed to foreign investment. If a sector 
is partially closed to foreign investment, the government states a maximum allowed 
percentage of foreign ownership. This indicates the need for foreign companies to have a 
local partner in order to be able to engage in business in that particular sector. Restricted 
sectors relevant for this thesis were the Oil & Gas sector and the Energy sector, which 
can be seen through the representation of Statoil and SN Power’s partnerships in this 
thesis. Gexcon managed to avoid this restriction, being a consulting company and not 
directly engaging in exploration and drilling operations.  
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The choice of a local partnership can therefore be related both to the perceived level of 
risk and uncertainty in Indonesia, as well as being a response to the Indonesian legislative 
regulations. As the companies in the case study that expressed the highest perceived level 
of risk also were the ones that were engaged in long-term partnerships, the proposition 
appears to be of a realistic nature.   
 
6.2.4 Proposition 4  
There is a reduction in perceived country risk as the firm acquires more culture 
specific experience. 
 
Based on the responses from the companies, there actually seemed to be a contradictory 
tendency to the theory that this proposition was based on. In fact, it seemed as if the level 
of culture specific experience, how long the company had been operating in - or in a 
similar culture to Indonesia, had the opposite effect on the level of perceived risk with 
operating in Indonesia than what was proposed by Barkema, Bell and Pennings (1996) 
and Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004).  
 
 
Figure 12: Perceived Country Risk and Culture Specific Experience. 
 
Even though all the companies expressed a relatively high level of perceived risk related 
to operations in Indonesia, the outlooks on risk among the more experienced companies 
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seemed to be of a more knowledge based nature than that of the less experienced 
companies. The causes of risk also varied between the types of business that the company 
conducted, as well as the level of resource commitment and level of physical presence in 
Indonesia.  
 
Wilhelmsen Ships Service has been active in Indonesia for 26 year, and the respondent 
had 14 years of experience with operating in Indonesia. He still expressed a very high 
level of perceived country risk. A lack of trustworthiness between foreign and local 
workers, corruption, a difficult bureaucracy and cumbersome legislation were mentioned 
as challenges. Statoil has 25 years of international experience and 10 years of culture 
specific experience with operation in Indonesia. The respondent from Statoil lived and 
worked there for six years, from the beginning of Statoil’s establishment in Indonesia. He 
also expressed high levels of risk regarding Statoil’s operations there, and stated that the 
longer he had lived and worked in Indonesia, the higher the cultural distance seemed to 
become. He mentioned Statoil’s experience with corruption in other countries as a lesson 
when entering Indonesia, and that this made them more aware of issues related to 
corruption. The respondent expressed the need to do thorough research about the target 
market as a key to mitigating risk, basing decisions on knowledge rather than 
assumptions. Dealing with politicians was also something the company tried to avoid, 
due to the Indonesian bureaucracy with many opportunities for briberies and corruption. 
Strict regulations in the oil & gas industry were also expressed as challenging for Statoil.  
 
SN Power has 13 years of international experience on several continents, and 11 years in 
the somewhat culturally similar Philippines. The respondent from SN Power had several 
years of experience with working in the Philippines. He stated a lower perceived cultural 
distance, but a higher level of perceived risk than some of the other companies. This risk 
was mainly related to Indonesian legislation, financial risks, environmental risks with 
natural disasters and earthquakes, as well as sustainability for the local communities 
affected by the project. Trying to avoid all kinds of corruption was of great importance to 
the company.  
 
These findings are comparable to the findings of Randøy and Dibrell (2002), that 
Norwegian companies that have extensive international experience, also have a larger 
abundance of resources and capabilities, which indicates that they will prefer high-
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resource entry modes. Less experienced firms will according to the authors be more 
constrained in their ability to manage large foreign market commitments, and therefore 
are more inclined to choose contractual modes. Wilhelmsen Ships Service, Statoil and SN 
Power were the companies with the longest international and culture specific experience, 
and they all have high-resource establishments in Indonesia.  
 
As previously mentioned, Ocean Supreme and AquaOptima were the companies that 
expressed the lowest levels of risk with operating in Indonesia. They were also two of the 
less experienced companies in the case study, along with Gexcon. As was found by 
Randøy and Dibrell (2002), less experienced companies will often prefer low 
commitment modes, such as exporting or licensing. Ocean Supreme and AquaOptima 
both have low-resource entry modes; exporting and licensing. However, Gexcon has had 
a subsidiary since the start, and must therefore be considered “an exception to the rule” in 
this case. As have previously been discussed, the reason for this may be that Gexcon had 
a much higher perceived need for control than Ocean Supreme and AquaOptima.  
 
Similarly to the findings of Ojala (2008), several of the companies entered the Indonesian 
market by using direct entry modes, even if there were significant levels of risk related to 
the establishment. As companies acquire more international experience, they will 
according to Johanson and Vahlne (1977) gradually move more towards direct 
investments, and higher levels of resource commitment. And a company that possesses 
both substantial industry experience and geographic experience will, according to 
Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004) favour a full ownership entry mode. Looking at some of 
the more experienced companies in this case study, Statoil, SN Power and Wilhelmsen 
Ship Service, they have all chosen to enter the Indonesian market with direct investments. 
Whether these choices were based solely on international experience, or due to some of 
the other factors such as need for control and Indonesian rule of law, cannot be said for 
certain. However, with increased international experience follows a larger abundance of 
capabilities, financial resources and “know-how”, which certainly can contribute to 
mitigating the level of risk for the company. As the respondent from Statoil stated, “The 
key lies within understanding, rather than assuming.”  
 
As mentioned, there seemed to be a contradictory tendency towards the proposition, with 
the fact that increased culture specific, international experience seemed to indicate an 
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increasing perception of risk with operating in the country, rather than decreasing. The 
proposition will therefore need further research. Still, international experience was found 
to play a part regarding the choice of entry mode, as the more experienced companies 
chose direct, high resource commitment entry modes, while most of the less experienced 
companies chose contractual, low resource commitment modes. This is similar to 
findings of Ojala (2008), Randøy and Dibrell (2002), Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004) as 
well as the stages of internationalisation provided by Johanson and Vahlne (1977). 
International experience evidently has an effect on the choice of entry mode, even though 
the proposition was not found to be empirically grounded.  
 
6.2.5 Proposition 5   
Large companies are more inclined to choose high resource commitment entry modes.   
 
Based on the data collected about the companies in this case study, we can see that there 
does seem to be a relationship between size and resource commitment, where large 
companies have chosen high resource commitment modes and smaller companies have 
chosen low resource commitment modes.  
 
 
Figure 13: Level of Resource Commitment and Company Size. 
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SN Power has the highest level of resource commitment, with its hydropower project in 
Sulawesi, Indonesia. SN Power is also amongst the larger companies in the case study. 
Statoil is a large company on a global scale, even if their presence in Indonesia is not the 
most substantial. Their level of resource commitment is high, with exploration and 
drilling activities “out in the field”. Wilhelmsen Ships Service is also a large company, 
but as their venture is based on service providing, the level of resource commitment is 
therefore lower than that of Statoil and SN Power.  
 
The smallest company, AquaOptima only has 3 employees, and an office in Trondheim, 
Norway. They only temporarily travel to the different locations in Indonesia during their 
projects. However, if the demand continues as expected, they are according to the 
respondent, considering opening an office in Jakarta, which will then increase their level 
of resource commitment in the country. Ocean Supreme is the second smallest company, 
with 14 employees and one office in Ålesund, Norway. They export through Indonesian 
distributors, whom they visit regularly, but their physical presence and level of resource 
commitment in Indonesia is still very low.  
 
Gexcon is again the exception of the rule, as they are among the smaller companies with 
a total of 40 employees of which 8 are in Indonesia, but still has an Indonesian 
subsidiary. The level of resource commitment is higher than that of Ocean Supreme and 
AquaOptima, but still lower than Statoil and SN Power. Looking at the type of business 
they conduct, Gexcon is similar to Wilhelmsen Ships Service, with being a service-based 
company. In some way, Wilhelmsen may therefore also be a bit of an exception, however 
they do still have a relatively high level of resource commitment, with a physical 
presence through their representative office in Jakarta, and by operating in several 
harbours in Indonesia.  
 
The findings of Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004), that the size of a company often is an 
indicator of its competitive advantage in financial, physical, human, technological, or 
organizational resources, and that large companies therefore will be more inclined to 
choose a high level of resource commitment in the foreign market, are similar to some of 
the cases here. Especially looking at high resource commitment companies like SN 
Power and Statoil. They would not be able to conduct their activities without the 
necessary of resources and capabilities such as technological and financial resources, 
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human capital, and industry “know-how”. Being in partnerships with local companies is 
also an advantage for Statoil and SN Power, considering that this further increases their 
access to local resources, knowledge and capabilities. 
 
The findings of Randøy and Dibrell (2002) that smaller companies or divisions serving 
the foreign markets may be constrained by their size and lack of resources and 
capabilities, is also similar to the findings of this case study. However, the fact that the 
smaller companies have low levels of resource commitment in Indonesia may also be due 
to other factors than a lack of resources. For instance, the respondents from Ocean 
Supreme stated that they did not view it as profitable to have a physical presence in 
Indonesia because things worked very well at present, and that it had therefore never 
been an option for them to increase their physical commitment in Indonesia.  
 
As the findings appear to be similar to that of Randøy and Dibrell (2002) and Ekeledo 
and Sivakumar (2004), in that there is a positive relationship between large firm size and 
a high level of resource commitment, the fifth proposition appears to be empirically 
grounded.   
 
6.2.6 Proposition 6  
There are differences between business sectors when it comes to the choice of entry 
mode. 
 
This was the proposition that had the weakest theoretical foundation, due to a quite 
limited amount of previous research. It was still interesting to see that there does appear 
to be some differences regarding sectors when comparing for the choice of entry mode. 





Figure 14: The Choice of Entry Mode and Company Sector. 
 
One reason for these differences may be due to the Indonesian rule of law, as there are 
differences regarding the issuing of permits and licenses for certain sectors. This is 
especially relevant when it comes to operations with high levels of resource commitment 
in sectors such as Oil & Gas and Energy. In order to get the necessary permits and 
licenses, the foreign company will need to get their licence through a partnership with a 
local company. This was the case with both Statoil and SN Power in Indonesia. 
 
Similarly to the findings of Sanchez-Peinado and Pla-Barber (2006) that companies in 
knowledge-intensive industries will prefer entry modes with a higher level of control than 
that of companies in capital-intensive industries, the most knowledge-intensive company 
in this case study, Gexcon, did indeed choose the highest control entry mode; a wholly 
owned subsidiary. 
 
Similarly to the findings of Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner (2002), the choice of entry 
mode for the case companies seemed in many cases to depend more on capital intensity 
and level of resource commitment, than on the actual differences between the sectors. If 
we look at Statoil and Gexcon, which are both operating in the Oil and Gas sector, their 
types of business differs greatly with Gexcon being a knowledge-intensive provider of 
consulting-services, and Statoil physically operating out in the field, exploring and 
 80 
drilling for oil, being a capital-intensive company. While the Aquaculture company 
AquaOptima goes out in “the field” to supervise and develop the building of aquafarming 
facilities, Ocean Supreme only freights their products to Indonesian distributors without 
having to establish any presence there.  
 
Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner (2002) also found statistical evidence that 
manufacturing companies were more likely to choose joint ventures, while service 
companies were more likely to choose wholly owned modes. Considering the companies 
in this case study, Wilhelmsen Ships Service and Gexcon are both service companies. 
They both have wholly owned modes - a representative office and a subsidiary. SN 
Power may be regarded as manufacturing company where the product is hydropower 
energy. And as previously mentioned, SN Power has a joint venture with Aboitiz as well 
as a split ownership of the Sulawesi project with PT Energi Infranusantara.    
 
Based on this discussion, the empirical findings related to this proposition, seems to be 
somewhat similar to the findings of Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner (2002) and 
Sanchez-Peinado and Pla-Barber (2006). The main finding indicates that the type of 
business, the level of capital-intensity, and the level of resource commitment seems to 
have a greater impact on the choice of entry mode than the actual differences between 
business sectors. Additionally, Indonesian rule of law was also found to play a role in the 





Evidently, there are many factors that may have an impact on the choice of entry mode. 
The most prominent finding throughout this research was the inclination of having 
partnerships with local, well-established companies. Indonesian rule of law also seemed 
to have a much larger impact on the choice of entry mode than what was first anticipated, 
especially regarding the establishment of foreign direct investments, and the need for 
local partnerships in specific sectors.  
 
Comparing the theoretical framework and previous empirical findings with the findings 
of this research, the main factors to have an impact the choice of entry mode were found 
to be perceived need for management control, perceived cultural distance and risk, level 
of resource commitment, and company size. The empirical indications of international 
experience, and company sector were found to be somewhat unclear. However, they still 
appeared to have a certain impact on the choice of entry mode. Especially international 
experience, with the finding that the companies with extensive international experience 
chose to enter Indonesia by using direct entry modes, while many of the less experienced 
companies entered with contractual modes.  
 
The main challenges for Norwegian companies operating in Indonesia were found to be 
related to the high level of corruption, a lack of trust between local and foreign 
employees, and issues with Indonesian import quotas. The keys to successful business in 
Indonesia were found to derive from the creation of strong, personal relationships with 
local stakeholders, and basing decisions on knowledge rather than assumptions about the 
country and its institutions. It will therefore be vital for any company entering Indonesia 
to conduct thorough market research and build up a good knowledge about the country’s 
formal and informal institutions, before making important decisions, such as the choice of 
entry mode.  
 
Even though several of the propositions appeared to be empirically grounded in their 
impact on the choice of entry mode, there are still some limitations of this thesis. The 
perhaps greatest limitation is that the case study was only able to graze the surface of this 
topic. To get a more accurate, and perhaps a more generalized picture of Norwegian 
companies’ entry mode choices in the Indonesian market, more companies should have 
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been included in the study. It would also have increased the credibility and 
trustworthiness of the thesis if all the interviews had been conducted in person, rather 
than through skype, phone calls and emails. Going deeper into each company, looking 
more closely at their actual operations, supply chains, marketing efforts, experience from 
other countries and so forth could have proven valuable in detecting new and improved 
aspects of the decision making process. It would also be interesting to look at how 
companies from other countries than Norway experience operating in Indonesia, and then 
make comparisons between countries. However, this would require more time and travel 
money, and must therefore rather be ideas for future research.  
 
Another idea for future research could be to look more closely at the use of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) by Norwegian companies in Indonesia. It would be very 
interesting to investigate whether the use of CSR could contribute to creating stronger, 
local relationships, and studying how this may affect the efficiency and profitability of 
the companies, as well as the development of the local communities.  
 
As Herbert Spencer (1864) drew parallels between economic and biological thinking, the 
statement “the survival of the fittest” is still relevant in the business world today. Only 
the companies that are able to fit - and to adapt to the rapid changes of society, 
technology, and the global economy, will be the ones to survive and be successful in the 
years to come. For Norwegian companies, it is clear that new boundaries needs to be 
crossed in order to further increase profits, and uphold the sustainability of the 
Norwegian industry. And innovation, internationalization and sustainable development 
for the future will undoubtedly be an important part of this.  
 
Indonesia, with its emerging economy, rapidly growing population and increasing 
purchasing power, harbours an abundance of profitable opportunities for those who are 
venturesome enough to try. Through decision making built on knowledge, rather than 
assumptions, with an openness to the local culture, and with the establishment of strong 
relationships, the entry into the Indonesian market can quickly become a success story for 
the company, as well as contributing to further growth and development of this up and 
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9.1 The Interview Guide 
Issue 1: The Company’s Establishment in Indonesia 
Question 1.1: What is the company’s current establishment in Indonesia?  
 
Question 1.2: Why did the company choose to enter Indonesia? 
 
Question 1.3: For how long has the company been active in Indonesia? 
 
Question 1.4: Have the company used the same establishment mode since the 
start-up in Indonesia? 
 
Question 1.5: If the company have operations in other countries, have the same 
mode of entry been used there? 
 
 
Issue 2: Risk and Control 
Question 2.1: How would you describe the management’s need for control in 
Indonesia? (and as compared to operations in Norway?)  
 
Question 2.2: How do you perceive the risk with operating in Indonesia? (and as 
compared to operations in Norway?) 
 
Question 2.3: How do you perceive the level of risk in your business sector 
compared to other sectors? 
 
Question 2.4: In your opinion, what is the most important, having a high level of 
control or to avoid high levels of risk? 
 
Issue 3: Cultural Distance 
Question 3.1: Are you currently or have you previously lived in Indonesia? (or 
another Asian country?) 
(If so, for how long?) 
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Question 3.2: How would you describe your experience with Indonesian business 
culture? 
 
Question 3.3: To what degree would you say that cultural distance between 
Norway and Indonesia has had an impact on the company’s business operations?  
 
Question 3.4: What would you say has been the company’s main challenge when 






9.2 Reflective Note   
1. The Thesis Topic and Main Findings 
The main topic of my thesis was the choice of entry mode in emerging markets, with a 
focus on Norwegian companies in the Indonesian market. This topic is in my opinion 
highly relevant today, as Indonesia is predicted to become one of the most important 
economies in the world within the next 10-15 years. Indonesia has the last few years had 
an annual GDP growth rate of around 5%, and with a growing middle class and 
increasing purchasing power, new opportunities for foreign investments are emerging. 
With the increasing economic uncertainty in Norway today, it is clear that Norwegian 
companies need to explore new and innovative ways of doing business, both inside and 
outside of Norway.  
 
International expansion has become a natural step in the development and survival of 
businesses everywhere. Venturing into emerging markets such as Indonesia, may not 
only be a vital part of the survival of Norwegian companies in the time to come, but it 
can also become an important factor in helping the Indonesian people out of poverty by 
creating employment, helping in the fight against corruption, exchanging technologies, 
and contributing to lowering the cultural barriers between the two nations.    
 
There has within the last ten years been a great increase in the number of Norwegian 
companies operating in Indonesia. At present, there are around 60 Norwegian companies 
directly or indirectly operating in the Indonesian market, either through exports, 
licensing, partnerships, joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries. The research 
method for this master thesis consisted of a case study of a selection of Norwegian 
companies that were in some way doing business in Indonesia. The data collection 
consisted of interviews with people in the relevant managerial positions of each 
company.    
 
One of the main findings was that local partnerships were preferred by most of the 
companies, irrespective of company size, sector and international experience. A high 
level of management control was found to be important, and many of the companies 
therefore preferred high-control entry modes. The majority of the companies also stated a 
high level of perceived cultural distance between Indonesia and Norway, and high levels 
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of perceived risk regarding their operations there. Corruption, lack of trust, irregular 
import quotas, and a complex bureaucracy were some of the main sources of this 
perceived risk.  
 
Company size and the level of resource commitment also seemed to play a major role in 
the choice of entry mode. Small, low resource commitment-companies often preferred 
more flexible, contractual entry modes, such as exporting and licensing, while large, high 
resource commitment-companies preferred direct entry modes such as wholly owned 
subsidiaries and joint ventures. Additionally, Indonesian rule of law was found to have an 
impact on the choice of entry mode, as there are certain restrictions regarding the 
establishment of foreign investments in Indonesia, and regarding the acquiring of licenses 
and permits.  
 
Conclusively, the key factor for successful business in Indonesia was found to reside in 
the creation of strong, personal relationships with local stakeholders and partners, basing 
decisions on knowledge and understanding rather than assumptions. 
      
2. The Thesis Topic and International Forces 
The business world today is more interconnected and interdependent than ever before, 
and economic, political and even natural events have consequences that extend far 
beyond the immediate surroundings in which they take place. An example of this is the 
dramatic drop in the Oil price last year, mainly due to an oversupply by the OPEC 
countries and a strong US Dollar, which has led to a butterfly effect that is now 
hampering the Norwegian economy.  
 
The international forces that are relevant to discuss regarding this thesis will of course 
vary somewhat between the different companies in the case study, as they are all 
conducting different types of business in different industries. The companies selected to 
participate in the case study were Gexcon, Statoil, AquaOptima, Ocean Supreme, SN 
Power and Wilhelmsen Ships service. And as consistently expressed by the companies, 
they all chose to enter the Indonesian market due to the fact that they saw advantageous 
and profitable opportunities there.  
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The respondents all expressed relatively high levels of perceived cultural distance and 
risk regarding their operations in Indonesia. The most prominent reported challenge for 
the companies was the high level of corruption in the country. Corruption is a force that 
definitely has international implications. For a company to operate internationally, it will 
always be important to adapt to the local business culture, however a Norwegian 
company will still have to answer to Norwegian rules and codes of conduct even when 
they are operating abroad. How a company chooses to deal with challenges such as 
corruption will therefore have a great impact on its success or failure as a company.  
 
One of the findings of the thesis was that the companies seemed to follow the “stages of 
internationalization” as was described by Johanson and Vahlne in 1977. According to the 
authors, companies are likely to internationalize in natural stages, where they first enter 
nearby markets by exporting through local agents, then by having joint ventures, and 
finally wholly owned subsidiaries. Even if many of the companies entered Indonesia with 
direct entry modes, such as wholly owned subsidiaries and representative offices, these 
were companies that already had extensive international experience from other, similar 
markets. Similar to the findings of Hill, Kim & Hwang (1990), Randøy & Dibrell (2002), 
and Brouthers & Hennart (2007), the perception of risk regarding the companies’ 
operations in Indonesia seemed to increase for direct entry modes such as wholly owned 
subsidiaries, and decreases for contractual modes such as exporting or licensing. This 
level of perceived risk can be related to political factors in the host country. As 
previously mentioned, the Indonesian rule of law was found to have an impact on the 
Norwegian companies entering Indonesia. In order to get the necessary permits and 
licenses, foreign companies often need to be in partnership with local companies. 
Acquiring the correct licences can also be time consuming, due to a cumbersome 
bureaucracy. And then again, corruption becomes an issue, as a higher level of 
bureaucracy tends to provide more opportunities for corruption, briberies and facilitation 
fees.  
     
3. The Thesis Topic and Innovation 
There are as previously mentioned, many business opportunities for Norwegian 
companies in the Indonesian market. Being a developing country, there is an abundance 
of possibilities for improvements than can easily be made through the exchange of 
technology, know-how and other capabilities that Norwegian companies may possess.  
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One example lies in the aquafarming industry. Indonesia is a huge archipelago with an 
abundance of species for fish farming, such as Barramundi and Tuna. Norway has many 
years of experience with this fish farming technology, and as I discovered while working 
as an Intern in Innovation Norway in Indonesia, the Indonesian fish farmers and local 
regencies are very interested in learning more about “the Norwegian way” of doing 
things. The Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries has declared its 
commitment to becoming the world’s leading fish producer by expanding its aquaculture 
industry and allocate US$ 108 million to upgrade the infrastructure and assist the local 
aquaculture industry. From the case study, AquaOptima is one of the companies that have 
discovered the possibilities within this industry, by providing their fish farming 
technologies and their own RAS system to Indonesian fish farmers. 
 
As expressed by Ibu Susi Pudjiastuti the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, during 
a conference I attended in Jakarta, Indonesia has now set an even stronger goal of 
becoming a leading maritime nation. A large fleet of ships, with estimated investment in 
container ships of $6.7 billion will therefore be needed by 2030. Consequently, there may 
be some great opportunities for the Norwegian shipbuilding industry there. 
 
Another opportunity lies within the energy sector. Indonesia is a large country and one of 
the most populous nations in the world. Still, only a small amount of the population have 
access to electricity on a daily basis, and the ones who do are often plagued by blackouts. 
Although the electricity production has increased with around 13% annually the last three 
years, around 12 million households are still without electricity (Innovation Norway, 
2015). Although the electricity sector is a centrally planned economy, private investors 
will according to Innovation Norway (2015) be able to play an increasingly significant 
role in the large investments that will take place in the years to come. The annual 
electricity consumption is expected to increase to 375 TWh in 2020, and the state owned 
electricity company, PLN, is planning to invest US$ 9.6 billion per year until 2020 
(Innovation Norway, 2015). In the thesis, I looked more closely at the Norwegian energy 
company SN Power, and their on-going establishment in Indonesia with the construction 
of a hydropower plant in West Sulawesi.   
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One of the main challenges for large cities such as the capital Jakarta is the increasing 
level of pollution. In an interview in The New York Times (2015), Dr. Budi Haryanto, 
chairman of the University of Indonesia’s Department of Environmental Health, said that 
air pollution now causes 2.8 million lost work days a year, along with 1.3 million 
absences at schools, 9,000 hospitalizations and at least 6,500 premature deaths. And 
according to data by the Indonesian Ministry of Health, the transportation sector 
contributes to between 70% and 80% of total outdoor air pollutants, with the number of 
vehicles increasing by around 10% every year (New York Times, 2015).  
 
Having lived in this immense city myself, I quickly learned that most people do not use 
any form of public transportation. This is mainly due to the fact there does not actually 
exist a well functioning transit system there. One solution to mitigating the level of 
dangerous toxins in the air may therefore be to develop better and more environmentally 
friendly forms of transportation, similar to the “sky trains” in Bangkok and Vancouver. 
According to Innovation Norway (2016), Indonesia plans to spend USD 464 billion on 
infrastructure development in the period 2015 - 2019, and these investments can 
represent great opportunities for Norwegian businesses with ideas for sustainable 
transportation systems and infrastructure development. 
 
4. The Thesis Topic and Responsibility 
There are many ethical considerations to be made when operating in Indonesia. As 
previously mentioned, there are several challenges one should be aware of regarding 
political relationships, the level of bureaucracy, the rule of law, and of course with the 
high level of corruption in the country. Conducting thorough analyses of both the formal 
and informal institutions of a country before entering the market, is therefore very 
important, in order to be well prepared for these challenges. 
 
When dealing with corruption, there are many ethical factors involved. As corruption, 
briberies and facilitation is so grounded in the country, it is not something that can be 
easily avoided in a business setting. Many Indonesian employees view facilitation fees as 
a natural part of doing business, and this will of course become a challenge for 
Norwegian companies operating in Indonesia, with Norwegian codes of conduct to 
follow. Fortunately, the fight against corruption is a major case for President Joko 
Widodo and the Indonesian government, and they are slowly trying to decrease the 
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opportunities for corruption by minimizing the level of bureaucracy, and increasing the 
use of web-based solutions. 
 
It is also important for any Norwegian company entering Indonesia to be aware of 
cultural differences that may have an impact on business culture and business relations. 
As previously mentioned, personal relationships are very important in Indonesia, and 
meeting face to face with potential partners, customers and other stakeholders is vital for 
success. These relationships can in my opinion be improved further by the use of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). With an increased focus on ethically creating 
shared value for the local community, this will not only contribute to improving 
relationships with the local community, it will also increase the welfare of the local 
workers, and hence improve the efficiency of operations and increase profits for the 
company. Such CSR efforts could for example consist of providing fair wages for the 
local employees, providing education for the children of the employees, and increasing 
the focus on environmental and social sustainability in the local community where the 
company operates.  
